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Law and Financial Development: What We Are 
Learning from Time-Series Evidence 
John Armour, Simon Deakin, Viviana Mollica, and Mathias Siems 
ABSTRACT 
The legal origins hypothesis is one of the most important and 
influential ideas to emerge in the social sciences in the past decade. 
However, the empirical base of the legal origins claim has always been 
contestable, as it largely consists of cross-sectional datasets, which provide 
evidence on the state of the law only at limited points in time. There is 
now a growing body of data derived from techniques for coding cross-
national legal variation over time. This time-series evidence is reviewed 
here and is shown to cast new light on some of the central claims of legal 
origins theory. Legal origins are shown to be of little help in explaining 
trends in the law relating to shareholder protection, although the 
classification of legal systems into English-, French-, and German-
origin “families” has greater explanatory force in the context of creditor 
rights. The widely-held view that increases in shareholder rights foster 
financial development is not supported by time-series analyses. More 
generally, the new evidence casts doubt on the suggestion that legal 
origins operate as an “exogenous” force, independently shaping both the 
content of laws and economic outcomes. It is more plausible to see legal 
systems as evolving in parallel with changes in economic conditions and 
political structures at national level. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars believe that legal institutions matter for financial 
development. According to the “legal origins” hypothesis developed 
by La Porta et al. and their collaborators (“LLSV”),1 legal systems 
vary considerably in the way they regulate economic activity. A 
principal cause of this diversity is the role played by the different 
legal traditions or “origins” of the common and civil law.2 Some 
argue that countries in which legal systems have a common law 
origin emphasize the protection of private property, whereas those 
with civil law roots favor an activist role for the state.3 These legal 
differences seem to have tangible economic effects. Common law 
systems have been found to have more dispersed share ownership,4 
more liquid and extensive capital markets,5 and more highly 
developed systems of private credit6 than civilian ones. In part 
through the Doing Business reports of the World Bank,7 these 
findings have come to influence policy reform in “dozens of 
countries” over the past decade.8 Reforms to corporate and 
bankruptcy law have seen a strengthening of shareholder and 
creditor rights, particularly the former.9 
Influential as it is, the legal origins hypothesis has raised more 
questions than it has answered. The idea that a country’s approach to 
the regulation of the economy is fixed at the point when it first 
adopts or has imposed upon it, through colonization or conquest, a 
certain type of legal order, implies that national systems are locked 
 
 1.  The acronym “LLSV” refers to the four authors of the first legal origins papers: 
Rafael La Porta, Francisco Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. See the 
references to their work, infra. 
 2.  Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins, J. ECON. LITERATURE 46, 285 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta et 
al., 2008]. 
 3.  Edward Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193, 1194 
(2002). 
 4.  Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate 
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 471 (1999). 
 5.  Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law 
and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1135–37 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., 1998]. 
 6.  See generally Simeon Djankov, Carelee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, Private Credit 
in 129 Countries, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 299 (2007) [hereinafter Djankov et al., 2007]. 
 7. WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS REPORTS (various years), available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org. 
 8.  La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 325. 
 9.  See infra, Part IV. 
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into particular developmental paths. This neglects the possibility of 
feedback effects between legal change and economic development. It 
also points to a potential contradiction in the use of the legal origins 
hypothesis to generate policy reforms: the common law model, while 
apparently more conducive to financial development, might not be 
appropriate for transplantation into civil law regimes. What is at stake 
here is the degree of fit between substantive rules and the legal 
structures said to underpin them. Adherents of the legal origins 
hypothesis suggest that legal changes can be undertaken “without 
disturbing the fundamentals of the legal tradition” of the countries 
concerned,10 a view supportive of the move to align civilian systems 
with the common law approach.  
A further issue is whether the postulated relationship between 
legal rules and economic outcomes is as tight as has been suggested. 
A central methodological tenet of the legal origins approach is that 
legal rules can be coded and the extent of cross-national legal 
diversity quantified as a preliminary step to testing for the economic 
effects of certain laws. Scholars first developed the legal origins 
hypothesis in the context of a legal coding exercise which showed 
that legal protection of outside investors against the threat of 
expropriation by corporate insiders was consistently higher in 
common law countries than in civil law ones. Econometric analysis 
was then used to show that “legal investor protection is a strong 
predictor of financial development,”11 as measured by the level of 
stock market activity and the degree of dispersion of share 
ownership.12 Although the scope of the legal origins claim has since 
been extended to cover a number of other areas of law and 
regulation, it is this early work on the relationship between law and 
finance, as subsequently extended and developed,13 that has proved 
most influential on law reform. Yet the empirical basis for this 
finding is limited; it mostly depends on cross-sectional data on the 
 
 10.  La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 325. 
 11.  Id. at 286. 
 12.  La Porta et al., 1998, supra note 5. 
 13.  See generally Djankov et al., 2007, supra note 6; Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, 
Caralee McLeish & Andrei Shleifer, Debt Enforcement Around the World (ECGI Finance, 
Working Paper No. 147, 2007); Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes 
& Andrei Shleifer, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430 (2008) 
[hereinafter Djankov et al., 2008]; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) [hereinafter La Porta et al., 
2006]. 
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laws of countries in the late 1990s, with no systematic coding of 
legal change over time. 
A decade after the publication of the first legal origins studies, we 
can now subject the legal origins hypothesis to tests that measure its 
validity as an instrument of policy in the areas of law and finance. In 
this paper we present time-series evidence of trends in corporate and 
bankruptcy law in a sample of twenty-five developed, developing, 
and transition systems over the period 1995 to 2005. We put this 
information in the context of a more in-depth study of five countries 
(France, Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States) over a thirty-six year period, 1970 to 2005. The evidence 
from the longitudinal datasets that we report here reveals the far-
reaching nature of the legal changes that have occurred over these 
periods, and in particular the last decade. There has been a consistent 
rise in levels of shareholder protection evident most clearly in the 
civil law systems, which have been catching up with their common 
law counterparts. In the area of creditor rights, there has been a less 
dramatic change. Nevertheless, a significant overall increase in 
protection has occurred, which is particularly marked in transition 
systems. In short, we see the effects of a process of legal alignment 
around the idea of legal support for financial development of the 
kind promoted by the World Bank14 and given intellectual support 
by the legal origins hypothesis.15  
We find, however, that legal convergence has not been translated 
into financial development of the kind predicted by the legal origins 
approach, or at least not yet. Econometric analyses that we report 
here indicate that legal changes of the kind we have tracked have not 
been reflected in increased levels of stock market activity. We explore 
why this might be by looking at a number of explanations. One is 
that laws which might be well suited for the liquid capital markets 
and dispersed ownership structures of the common law world (in 
particular Britain and America) are not working as intended in civil 
law and developing systems where those conditions do not prevail. 
Another is that the enactment of shareholder rights on the scale that 
we have seen over the past decade could have been 
counterproductive, in common law and civil law systems alike.  
 
 14.  Through the DOING BUSINESS reports, supra note 7. 
 15.  La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 323–27. 
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Our paper aims to make three contributions to the legal origins 
literature. Our first is theoretical: we show that there are difficulties 
in viewing the legal system as an entirely “exogenous” influence on 
the economy and that it may be more useful to see legal systems as 
both shaping and being shaped by economic and political factors, an 
approach we label “coevolutionary.” Our second aim is 
methodological: we demonstrate how the coding and measurement 
of legal rules can be undertaken on a longitudinal basis and how the 
resulting data can be used in conjunction with time-series and panel-
data econometric techniques to throw light on the direction of 
causation in the relationship between legal and economic change. 
Our third aim is normative, in the sense of evaluating how far 
evidence and analysis of this kind could or should be used to inform 
the process of legal reform. 
Part II below provides an overview of legal origins theory, 
emphasizing the way in which the theory has developed in response 
to empirical findings and to certain critiques. In Part III we take a 
closer look at methodological issues and explain the “leximetric” and 
econometric techniques that we employ to study legal change and its 
interaction with economic variables. Part IV presents our main 
findings and Part V offers a theoretical reevaluation of the legal 
origins hypothesis in the light of this new empirical evidence. Part VI 
concludes. 
II. LEGAL ORIGINS: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND 
THEORY 
A. Explaining Legal Origins 
The legal origins literature began with a series of empirical 
findings requiring explanation; only gradually did a theory emerge 
that aimed to provide a systematic account of these results. As noted 
above, the earliest legal origins studies focused on the relationship 
between legal protection of investor interests and financial outcomes 
including ownership structure and capital market development. 
LLSV’s “antidirector rights”16 index contains six principal indicators 
of shareholder protection: the extent to which the corporate law of a 
given system allowed voting by proxy; whether the law prevented the 
blocking of voting and other rights associated with share ownership 
 
 16.  La Porta et al., 1998, supra note 5, at 1127–28. 
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prior to a shareholders’ meeting; whether it contained a “cumulative 
voting” rule that allowed for representation of minority shareholder 
interests on the board; whether it provided legal mechanisms, such as 
derivative suits, available to minority shareholders to protect against 
“perceived oppression by directors”; whether it provided for 
shareholders’ preemption rights in respect of new share issues, 
thereby preventing the dilution of stakes; and the extent of voting 
rights required to call a shareholders’ meeting. Two further 
indicators, referring respectively to the one-share-one-vote rule and 
laws on mandatory dividends, were used in some of their analyses. 
They found, on the basis of legal data collected for forty-nine 
countries in the mid-1990s, that low scores on the index were 
associated with a high concentration of ownership and a low level of 
stock market development as measured by the ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP.17 These relationships were especially strong in 
French civil law systems, justifying the conclusion that “legal systems 
matter to corporate governance and . . . firms have to adapt to the 
limitations of the systems that they operate in.”18 
This first “law and finance” paper proved to be extraordinarily 
influential in demonstrating the possibilities of quantitative legal 
analysis. It produced a clear empirical finding with far-reaching 
implications for policy debates. In subsequent studies, researchers 
tried new methods for coding the law, with the focus on the 
operation of legal rules in a series of hypothetical cases. Evidence was 
gathered from surveys of practicing lawyers in a range of countries. 
Researchers adopted this different approach to address some of the 
criticisms of the early studies. In particular, the new methods, by 
drawing on survey evidence from legal practitioners, were intended 
to incorporate evidence concerning the enforcement of legal rules 
and to avoid undue subjectivity in the coding process. On this basis, 
a second wave of results essentially confirmed the findings of the 
early studies: there was a clear divide between the common law and 
the civil law with respect to rules on self-dealing in corporate 
transactions,19 prospectus disclosure,20 and creditor rights.21 These 
legal differences were reflected in financial outcome variables, 
 
 17. Id. at 1145. 
 18. Id. at 1117. 
 19. See generally Djankov et al., 2008, supra note 13. 
 20. See generally La Porta et al., 2006, supra note 13. 
 21. See generally Djankov et al., 2007, supra note 6. 
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including, in the context of creditor rights, the size of private debt 
markets.22 The common law-civil law divide also operated in related 
areas of economic life, such as labor regulation23 and rules on 
business start-ups.24 The divide also had consequences for 
unemployment and employment levels, the size of the informal 
economy, and the level of corruption. In addition, a set of studies 
looked at aspects of legal institutions including the flexibility of court 
procedure25 and the extent of judicial independence;26 these 
institutional variables appeared to correlate with contract 
enforcement and the protection of property rights.27 
These findings “raise[d] an enormous challenge of 
interpretation.”28 What has emerged from the iteration of theory and 
evidence over the past decade is a claim that it is not so much legal 
rules themselves that matter, as the infrastructure of the legal system. 
“Legal infrastructure” refers to the meta-level rules, norms, and 
practices that determine, in a given national context, the mechanisms 
for law making and dispute resolution, the competencies of 
legislatures and courts, and the conception of the role of government 
in the economy and society, among other things. In this broad sense, 
“legal origin” is not confined to formal legal institutions but may 
extend to include informal norms and shared assumptions about the 
prevailing “style of social control of economic life.”29 The civil law 
“style” is “associated with a heavier hand of government ownership 
and regulation than the common law” and, as a result, with “greater 
corruption, larger unofficial economy, and higher unemployment.” 
The common law, by contrast, “is associated with lower formalism of 
 
 22. See generally id. It should be noted that while there is some evidence that financial 
development indicators, such as the extent of stock market capitalization and private credit, are 
correlated with overall levels of economic growth as measured by GDP, it has not proved 
possible to find a link between legal origins as such and GDP growth. See La Porta et al., supra 
note 2, at 301–02. 
 23.  See generally Juan Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Regulation of Labor, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1340 (2004). 
 24.  See generally Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Andrei Shleifer, The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2002). 
 25.  See generally Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Andrei Shleifer, Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453 (2003). 
 26.  See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches & 
Andrei Shleifer, Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445 (2004). 
 27.  The evidence is summarized by La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 293–98. 
 28.  Id. at 286. 
 29.  Id. 
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judicial procedures and greater judicial independence than civil law,” 
and hence with “better contract enforcement and greater security of 
property rights.”30  
The persistent influence of legal origin is the result of the 
tendency of the legal system, in the first instance, to operate as a 
mechanism for the stabilization of norms and practices. Legal 
institutions promote particular routines, conventions, and 
distributional compromises, which can be understood as providing 
solutions to various collective action problems and related issues of 
societal coordination. As such, they display the characteristics of 
lock-in and path-dependence, which are associated with the 
development of formal institutions:  
 
[T]he reason for persistence is that . . . beliefs and 
ideologies become incorporated in legal rules, 
institutions, and education and, as such, are 
transmitted from one generation to the next. It is this 
incorporation of beliefs and ideologies into the legal 
and political infrastructure that enables legal origins 
to have such persistent consequences for rules, 
regulations, and economic outcomes.31  
 
Legal systems also allow for the transmission of norms and 
practices across different regulatory spaces. Apart from a few 
“parent” systems (such as England, France, and Germany), most 
countries have had the basic features of their legal systems imposed 
upon them by colonization or conquest. When this kind of 
transplantation occurred at various points in the period from the late 
eighteenth to the early twentieth century, it was not just “specific 
laws and codes” that were transmitted, but “more general styles or 
ideologies of the legal system,” along with “individuals with mother-
country training, human capital, and legal outlook.”32 Over time, the 
national laws of particular countries might have “changed, evolved, 
and adapted to local conditions,” but “[e]nough of the basic 
transplanted elements have remained and persisted to allow the 
classification [of systems] into legal traditions.”33 This is the basis for 
 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 308. 
 32.  Id. at 288. 
 33.  Id. 
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the suggested division of the legal systems of the world into four 
principal groupings, namely English or common law, and the 
French, German, and Scandinavian variants of civil law.34  
A key feature of this theorization of the law-economy 
relationship is the claim that legal origin operates as an exogenous or 
independent force influencing the path of economic development 
(see Figure 1). As just stated, legal origins theory acknowledges that 
local economic conditions may, to some degree, shape legal rules in 
a given national context. To that extent, there is mutual feedback 
between law and economy, and the direction of causation runs both 
ways. Thus, legal origins theory can accept the possibility that many 
features of modern corporate law regimes can be explained by the 
particular types of business enterprise that prevailed in certain 
countries at important points in their development, or that trends in 
the regulation of financial markets were driven by the emergence of 
particular types of financial transactions. It can also accommodate the 
idea that the emergence of interest groups prepared to lobby for laws 
of a given type, or to litigate particular disputes, in the corporate 
field as elsewhere, may have been an important influence on the 
content of these laws.35 What is suggested, however, is that these 
feedback effects do not reach back to the core legal infrastructure of 
the country concerned. The core legal infrastructure is unchanging, 
or at least very slow to change by comparison to both the legal rules 
themselves and to the wider economic and social environment: “The 
legal system supplies the fundamental tools for addressing social 
concerns and it is that system . . . with its codes, distinctive 
institutions, modes of thought and even ideologies, that is very slow 
to change.”36 
 
 
 
 
 
 34.  Id. at 288–90. 
 35. See generally John Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001) (arguing that the United States’ 
dispersed ownership system of corporate governance is more susceptible to political interest 
groups than the concentrated ownership system of countries like Germany); Brian R. Cheffins, 
Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 459 (2001) (discussing the impact of political interest groups on the United 
Kingdom’s form of the dispersed ownership system). 
 36.  La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 307. 
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————————————————————————————— 
Figure 1: Legal origin as an exogenous influence on legal rules and 
the economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
————————————————————————————— 
In Figure 1, substantive legal rules provide the “channel” 
through which legal origin shapes economic outcomes. Legal rules 
may not, however, be the only such channel. Legal origins theory 
raises the possibility that, independent of the content of rules, 
judicial style and modes of enforcement more generally influence the 
economy. Empirical research demonstrating a link between the 
quality of judicial enforcement of creditor rights and the flow of 
private credit supports this suggestion.37 Another possible channel is 
provided by the interpretative rules, which courts follow when 
construing and enforcing contracts. Common law judicial style is, it 
is argued, more flexible in responding to new types of financial 
transactions, a flexibility which “promotes financial development” by 
legitimizing transactional innovation.38 
B. The Complexity of Legal Origins 
A potential line of criticism of the explanation given by LLSV for 
their legal origins findings is that the broad-brush descriptions they 
provide of common law and civilian regulatory “style” are 
overstylized to the point of being inaccurate. The law and finance 
literature assumes that a clear distinction can be drawn between 
systems by reference to their membership in one of the four main 
legal families. The reason for choosing this classification is not 
explained in detail. Some general references are made to the 
mainstream comparative law literature,39 suggesting that this 
 
 37.  Id. at 299. 
 38.  Id. at 300. 
 39. The following sources constitute this mainstream literature: RENÉ DAVID & JOHN 
E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (3d ed. 1985); KONRAD 
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed. 1998); THOMAS 
H. REYNOLDS & ARTURO A. FLORES, FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT SOURCES OF CODES AND 
Legal origin Legal rules Economic outcomes 
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distinction is well established and uncontroversial. However, modern 
comparative law scholarship barely recognizes the global 
classifications and generalizations of the law and finance literature. 
On a general level, three degrees of criticism can be 
distinguished. First, some legal scholars doubt whether even the 
distinction between “common law” and “civil law” can be justified 
from a historical perspective.40 Second, others accept the idea of two 
different legal origins as a historical starting point but emphasize 
that, since the end of the twentieth century, legal systems are 
becoming international, transnational, or even global in nature, so 
that the idea of a strict common law-civil law divide is an 
anachronism.41 Third, even those comparative lawyers who still apply 
the notion of legal families emphasize the limits of this concept, 
stating that it is really no more than a didactic device.42  
More specifically, the law and finance literature overlooks the 
difficulties involved in classifying many countries as either common 
law or civil law in origin. The idea that the laws and legal institutions 
of the parent systems have simply spread to other parts of the world 
disregards the ongoing influence of pretransplant laws, the mixtures 
and modifications that occur at the moment when copying of foreign 
law occurs, and the posttransplant period in which the transplanted 
laws and institutions may be altered (or at least applied differently 
than in the parent system).43 Examples of this are plentiful. For 
example, the law and finance literature assumes that the transition 
economies of Eastern Europe are either German or French legal 
origin countries, whereas in practice they have been influenced by a 
number of different traditions. Similarly, it is assumed that Japan, 
 
LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD (1989). 
 40. Stefan Vogenauer, An Empire of Light? Learning and Lawmaking in the History of 
German Law, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 481, 483 (2005); Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny’s Legacy 
Legal History, Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a European Legal Science, 112 L.Q. 
REV. 576, 588 (1996). 
 41. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the 
International Age, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1115 (2001); Jaakko Husa, Classification of Legal 
Families Today—Is it Time For a Memorial Hymn?, REV. INT. DR. COMP. 11 (2004). 
 42. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 39, at 21 (“[I]t is no more than a didactic device.”); 
ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 39, at 72 (“[A]ny division of the legal world into families is a 
rough and ready device. It can be useful for the novice, by putting the confusing variety of 
legal systems into some kind of loose order, but the experienced comparatist will have 
developed a ‘nose’ for the distinctive style of national legal systems . . . .”). 
 43. Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative 
Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 55, 70 (2007). 
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South Korea, and China are German legal origin countries, whereas a 
more nuanced analysis would have to take into account the 
indigenous legal cultures of these legal systems as well as more recent 
Anglo-Saxon influence. Further, classifying countries such as Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen as simply “common law” in origin 
underplays the role of religious legal traditions.44 
A counterargument to the one just made could be that the law 
and finance literature is specifically concerned with the rules that are 
relevant for “doing business.” Here, it is indeed the case that the law 
of developed countries has had a discernible influence on most 
African, Asian, and Latin American legal systems. Yet, in these areas 
of law it is difficult to justify using the suggested distinction between 
English, French, German, and Scandinavian legal origins. Formally, 
at least, case law is the primary source of law in common law 
jurisdictions, whereas in civil law jurisdictions, codes and related 
legislation constitute the primary source of law. However, the 
sources of corporate law, securities law, and bankruptcy law are 
mainly statutory across the world, even in common law countries.45  
This is not to say that we should not expect to find some 
similarities among countries regarded as belonging to the same legal 
family. Countries of the same legal origin often share a common 
language. For example, if Spain amends its corporate law, it is more 
likely that this reform will diffuse to the Spanish-speaking countries 
of Latin America than to the Anglophone world.46 Certain countries 
have developed a shared legal heritage due to coordinated efforts to 
develop common solutions to legal problems and to systematize the 
exchange of legal information, as in the case of the Scandinavian 
systems.47 It is not necessary to invoke legal origin as an explanation 
for these trends.  
Harmonization of laws and the borrowing of legal concepts and 
rules from foreign systems may also go on across legal families, 
particularly in the field of law and finance. There is a long tradition 
 
 44. See id. at 62–70. 
 45. See, e.g., Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Diversity in Shareholder Protection in 
Common Law Countries, 5 J. FOR INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS 3, 5 (2007). 
 46. See Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants—Legal Families and the 
Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2009); Mathias M. Siems, 
Shareholder Protection Around the World (“Leximetric II”), 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 138, 142 
(2008).  
 47. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 39, at 281–83. 
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in commercial law of legal transplants, often driven by international 
trade, to the extent that commentators have questioned the 
relevance of a strict division between legal families.48 Some studies 
suggest that by the end of the nineteenth century the most 
important features of corporate law were already relatively uniform 
across countries.49 
Legal origins theorists have responded to points such as these by 
conceding that most national legal systems contain hybrid elements, 
in part as a consequence of the borrowing or voluntary acceptance of 
regulatory solutions on a cross-country basis. Thus it is accepted that 
most of securities law, for example, is statutory even in common law 
systems, and that this is an area of law that was introduced relatively 
recently in “response to perceived social needs.”50 However, the 
suggestion is then made that laws of this kind “took different forms 
in countries with different legal traditions, consistent with broad 
strategies of how the state intervenes.” In America and Britain, the 
response to the crisis of the 1930s was “to rehabilitate and support 
markets, not to replace them,” while in civil law countries it was “to 
repress . . . or to replace [the market] with state mandates.”51 It is 
thus claimed that legal origin shapes the way in which different 
systems respond to common crises and new social needs. 
The “exogeneity” of the legal infrastructure with regard to 
economic development is not simply an incidental feature of legal 
origins theory. It would be hard to maintain the view that the legal 
origins effect, apparently identified in the empirical studies, is not a 
proxy for something else without it. This view, in turn, justifies the 
use made of legal origins theory to promote institutional reform. 
Because legal origin locks systems into particular institutional 
configurations, inefficiencies can result, in particular in the 
developing world: “[m]any developing countries today find 
themselves heavily overregulated in crucial spheres of economic life, 
in part because of their legal origin heritage.”52 While common law 
 
 48. Detlev Vagts, Comparative Company Law—The New Wave, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 
DRUEY, 595, 598–99 (2000). 
 49. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 439–40 (2001); see also MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN 
SHAREHOLDER LAW 17–22 (2008). 
 50. La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 308. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 287. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/26/2010 1:14 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1448 
rules are not “always”53 the most efficient, the default position of 
legal origins theory appears to be that common law solutions are 
generally to be preferred to civilian ones, not least because the right 
response to persistent legal inefficiencies “is simply less government 
intervention.”54 Civilian responses are seen as desirable only in a 
context of extreme crisis and disorder, in which markets break down 
completely.55 The deregulatory reform agenda associated with the 
Doing Business reports of the World Bank56 is claimed to be a natural 
offshoot of legal origins theory on this basis.57 
C. Endogeneity and Coevolution 
The emergence of “legal origins theory” as a response to the 
challenges raised by empirical research on law and development has 
provided a sounder conceptual foundation for this line of research 
and has clarified certain aspects of the claims being made. The legal 
system continues to be at the center of the analysis, but the idea of 
legal origin has been broadened to include elements of belief 
systems, ideologies, and social norms, as well as more formal legal 
institutions. Some limitations of the use of the concept of legal 
families have been acknowledged, while the underlying value of the 
division of systems along English, French, German, and Scandinavian 
lines has been reasserted. The exogenous causal influence of legal 
infrastructure remains, with a reduced role for substantive legal rules 
in shaping economic outcomes, as alternative channels (enforcement 
and interpretation) have been proposed.  
The critical issue in addressing the legal origins approach at a 
theoretical level is, therefore, the question of law’s “exogeneity” with 
regard to the process of economic development. Notwithstanding 
the mediation of the effects of legal infrastructure through various 
channels, the direction of causation can run only one way, from legal 
origin to the economy. The theory is asymmetrical in its treatment of 
the legal and economic systems. It requires us to believe that there is 
some factor that renders the core of the legal system immune from 
 
 53. Id. at 309. 
 54. Id. at 324. 
 55. Id. at 327. 
 56. WORLD BANK, supra note 7. 
 57. La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 307. 
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economic influence but which does not prevent the legal system 
from shaping the economy.  
One alternative is to reverse the arrow of causation so that law is 
shaped by economic or political forces. This is by no means an 
implausible position; on the contrary, it is one with a long history in 
certain strands of the sociological and economic analyses of law. 
Moreover, it appears to be widely accepted, if not always explicitly 
acknowledged, in the social sciences more generally.58 A good reason 
for not taking this view, however, is that it would represent 
something of a step back in the conceptualization of the law-
economy relation. The legal origins literature, at the least, has done 
enough to demonstrate that the legal system should be treated as a 
causal variable in its own right, with the capacity to shape economic 
outcomes. To this extent at least, we share the claim that “legal 
systems matter” with the founders of the legal origins approach. We 
disagree, however, with the characterization of the legal system (or, 
at least, that part of it that can be characterized as “legal 
infrastructure”) as entirely exogenous with regard to the economy. 
In proposing that law is better thought of as, at least in part, 
“endogenous” to the economy, we are not arguing that either legal 
rules or the “legal infrastructure” are predetermined by economic 
forces. The claim, rather, is that the dynamic of interaction between 
law and the economy is one of “coevolution,” as opposed to linear, 
unidirectional change.59 The legal system is, to a certain degree, 
autonomous from economic relations, and its development is not 
simply dictated by technological or organizational requirements, or 
by changes in the composition of supply and demand; legal concepts, 
processes, and routines form the immediate material from which new 
solutions are fashioned.60 Nevertheless, the economy forms part of 
 
 58. For a review of theories that view legal rules as “epiphenomenal,” that is, as a 
secondary form or expression of “material” social and economic relations, see Geoffrey M. 
Hodgson, The Enforcement of Contract and Property Rights: Constitutive Versus Epiphenomenal 
Conceptions of Law, 13 INT. REV. SOC. 375 (2003). 
 59. The concept of coevolution has roots in evolutionary biology, game theory, and 
systems theory, and is increasingly applied to explain the evolution of economic and legal 
institutions. See, e.g., MASAHIKO M. AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS (2001) (describing evolutionary game theory); GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN 
AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (1993) (describing systems theory). A full account of these theories, 
and an assessment of the possibilities for synthesis between them, is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 60. On this “self-referential” aspect of legal evolution, see TEUBNER, supra note 59. 
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the context within which legal rules evolve, with pressures for 
selection being applied by the external environment.61 These 
propositions can all be reversed: economic relations evolve, in part, 
by reference to an institutional context set by the legal system, and 
the same point applies, mutatis mutandis, if the political system is 
included in the model (see Figure 2).62  
 
————————————————————————————— 
Figure 2. Coevolutionary model of the legal, economic and political 
systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
————————————————————————————— 
Most scholars of corporate law would accept that there is a link 
of some kind between the emergence and development of the 
business enterprise in industrial societies, and the evolution of legal 
forms, associated with the joint stock company, which have served 
the needs of entrepreneurs and investors. There is considerable 
disagreement, however, on the question of whether legal change 
 
 61. On the application of the “Darwinian” evolutionary mechanisms of variation, 
inheritance, and selection to legal change, see TEUBNER, supra note 59, at 51. See generally 
Simon Deakin, Evolution for Our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics, 55 CURRENT LEGAL 
PROBS. 1 (2002). 
 62. The incorporation of political economy considerations into the study of institutions 
is a core feature of the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach. See Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, 
An Introduction to the Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David 
Soskice eds., 2001). And it is a core feature of Mark Roe’s “political” theory of corporate 
governance. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003). 
Political 
system 
Legal system 
Economy 
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preceded financial development, or the converse. In the context of 
the legal origins debate, there is a growing literature looking at the 
evolution of corporate law in Britain, France, Germany, and the 
United States in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.63 One strand of this work argues that financial 
development in Britain preceded by several decades the passage of 
laws for shareholder protection, while other studies emphasize that 
functional equivalents to corporate law,64 such as stock exchange 
rules, were already providing a basis for the dispersion of ownership 
and control in the late nineteenth century.65 A plausible 
interpretation of this historical evidence is that “shareholder rights 
have improved enormously in Britain over the course of the 
twentieth century, parallel to the growth of its markets.”66 The logic of 
coevolution, or mutual influence between law and the economy, 
better describes this process than does one of linear adjustment of 
the law to economic imperatives, or vice versa. 
It is important to stress that a “coevolutionary” conception of 
legal change does not predict seamless adjustment between the legal 
and economic systems. It is possible that they will be out of sync 
with each other for prolonged periods and that, as a result, legal 
institutions will very often be imperfectly matched for the economic 
goals they purport to serve. Indeed, insofar as legal concepts are 
functional, they may well be functional with regard to past 
environments rather than those in which they currently operate.67 
The efficiency of institutions also needs to be judged in context; 
particular rules may be more or less efficient depending on the  
 
 
 
 
 
 63. See Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Legal Regime and Contractual 
Flexibility: A Comparison of Business Organizational Choices in France and the United States 
During the Era of Industrialization, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 28 (2005); Leslie Hannah, The 
“Divorce” of Ownership from Control from 1900 Onwards: Re-Calibrating Imagined Global 
Trends, 49 BUS. HIST. 404 (2007). 
 64. Cheffins, supra note 35. 
 65. See generally Hannah, supra note 63. 
 66. La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 321 (emphasis added). 
 67. See Deakin, supra note 61, at 12–13. 
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presence of complementary institutions alongside which they have 
evolved.68 Thus,  
 
it may not be accidental that codetermination in the 
corporate governance domain and social democratic 
corporatism in the polity domain coevolved in 
Germany, while the main bank system, the lifetime 
employment system, and the close alliance between 
industrial associations and relevant administrative 
bureaux coevolved in Japan, both in contrast to the 
so-called Anglo-American model.69  
 
It has been suggested that institutional theories should be 
evaluated by how well they address two core problems:  
 
the synchronic problem, whereby the goal is to 
understand the complexity and diversity of overall 
institutional arrangements across . . . economies as an 
instance of multiple equilibria of some kind, and the 
diachronic problem, whereby the goal is to 
understand the mechanism of institutional 
evolution/change in a framework consistent with an 
equilibrium view of institutions, but allowing for the 
possibility of the emergence of novelty.70  
 
Legal origins theory provides answers to these questions, which are 
in various ways incomplete or unsatisfactory. Its answer to the 
“synchronic problem” is that cross-national diversity results from the 
inherited effect of the transplantation of legal orders. This is 
potentially a good answer if seen as a partial explanation for diversity, 
but not if seen as excluding other possible causes, which are derived 
from cross-national differences in modes of business organization 
and political organization. Its answer to the “diachronic problem” is 
that systems, for the most part, are locked into particular 
 
 68. See Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, Path Dependence, Corporate 
Governance and Complementarity, 5 INT’L FIN. 311 (2002); Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, 
Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional 
Complementarity?, 41 L. & SOC. REV. 866 (2007). 
 69. AOKI, supra note 59, at 17. 
 70. Id. at 2–3 (emphasis omitted). 
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developmental paths, which are the consequence of their legal origin. 
This lock-in effect is largely detrimental to economic development in 
the civil law context and largely positive in the common law one. 
Some movement towards more efficient rules, which legal origins 
theory tends to identify with convergence on common law practice, 
may be achieved through the benchmarking of national regulatory 
regimes by international institutions, including the World Bank. 
From a coevolutionary perspective, this view is deficient in not 
allowing for the possibility that legal institutions in civilian systems 
may be well matched to local economic conditions—or at least as 
well matched as in common law systems—thanks to mutual feedback 
with local economic conditions, and to the institutional 
complementarities to which this gives rise.71 If that is the case, 
attempts at convergence that take the common law systems as a 
model of best practice are likely to be either ineffective or 
counterproductive. 
We now turn to a consideration of how empirical analysis, in 
particular using quantitative methods, can throw light on these 
questions. 
III. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF LAW 
The initial legal coding exercises carried out by LLSV have been 
criticized on a number of grounds, including errors in the values 
attributed to certain specific legal rules and bias in the selection of 
variables.72 We do not want to go over this ground again, as it is well 
known and has to some degree been taken on board by LLSV in 
their more recent empirical analyses.73 Instead, our aim is to set out 
 
 71. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 39, at 39–40 (suggesting that “different legal 
systems give the same or very similar solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life, 
despite the great differences in their historical development, conceptual structure, and style of 
operation,” an argument applied specifically to the manner in which “developed nations meet 
the needs of legal business”). 
 72. See Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and 
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697 (2005); Holger Spamann, 
On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘Anti-director Rights Index’ under 
Consistent Coding (ECGI Law, Working Paper No. 67, 2006); Holger Spamann, ‘Law and 
Finance’ Revisited (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center, Discussion Paper No. 12, 
2008); Udo Braendle, Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany—On the Fallacy of 
LLSV (German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Paper No. 18, 2006), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art18. 
 73. See La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2. 
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the basis for our own approach to coding, which principally differs 
from that of LLSV in providing a longitudinal measure of legal 
variation across systems. We set out below some of the 
methodological issues encountered in coding the law (“leximetrics”) 
and in using time-series and panel-data econometric techniques to 
analyze the resulting legal data. 
A. Index Construction: Selection of Variables, Countries, and Time 
Periods 
All legal indices involve the reduction of a complex institutional 
reality to a summary form, which allows for statistical analysis. The 
choice of variables, the method of defining indicators, and the 
algorithms or protocols used for the coding of the legal rules should 
each reflect the purpose for which the dataset is constructed. In the 
case of the datasets we are considering here, the aim of the analysis is 
to clarify the nature of the relationship between legal and economic 
change and, more specifically, to examine the impact of law on 
financial development and vice versa. Accordingly, we have 
constructed datasets that aim to provide an account of how well 
different legal systems protect certain shareholder and creditor rights. 
Our guiding assumption in each case is that legal rules are capable of 
facilitating commercial transactions by reducing agency costs and 
other frictions in relations between corporate actors. Our 
shareholder protection indices therefore measure how far legal rules 
protect external shareholders against the risk of expropriation by 
managers and boards, on the one hand, and dominant blockholders 
or majority shareholders, on the other, principally in the context of 
listed companies. The creditor protection indices measure the extent 
to which aspects of corporate and bankruptcy law rank claims and 
allocate liabilities between different groups of shareholders and 
creditors, both while the company is a going concern and in the 
event of insolvency. The selection of the variables of interest in each 
case was guided by the comparative law principle of “functional 
equivalents,” according to which different legal systems may achieve 
the same end or goal through different means, depending on local 
contexts and conditions.74 By including, as far as possible, variables 
that reflect different legal approaches and traditions, we hope to 
minimize the risk of “home-country bias” or the tendency to take 
 
 74. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 39, at 39. 
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the law of one particular country or set of countries as a model or 
benchmark, thereby distorting the results.75 
LLSV’s antidirector rights index covered forty-nine countries and 
some of their later datasets extended to almost one hundred.76 
Covering as many countries as possible is desirable from the point of 
view of ensuring a comprehensive or representative sample. 
However, the more countries that are coded, the greater the risk that 
the choice of variables or the definition of the indicators will be 
inappropriate for some of them. There is also a potential trade-off 
between the breadth and depth of coverage. For these reasons, we 
proceeded to construct our indices in two stages.  
In the first stage, we created datasets based on extensive indices 
for a small number of countries over a lengthy time period. This 
allowed us to examine certain countries in depth. We chose countries 
not because they were representative, but because of their intrinsic 
interest as “parent” systems (France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom), its status as the world’s largest and arguably most 
influential economy (the United States), or its status as the largest 
democracy by population (India). The period studied was over three 
decades long (1970-2005), enabling us to chart trends in legal 
change across a number of economic cycles and major political 
watersheds, including the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. Our five-
country shareholder protection index contains sixty indicators, and 
the corresponding creditor protection index has forty-four. As the 
laws are coded once for each year, we have (60 + 44) * 36 * 5 = 
18,720 observations in these two datasets.77  
 
 75. For critiques along these lines, see supra note 72; see also Erik Berglöf & Ernst-
Ludwig von Thadden, The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for 
Transition and Developing Countries (Stockholm School of Economics, Working Paper No. 
263, 1999); John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership 
Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1699 (2002); Mathias M. Siems, What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A 
Critique on La Porta et al.’s Methodology, INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 300 (2005); 
Mathias M. Siems, Numerical Comparative Law: Do We Need Statistical Evidence in Order to 
Reduce Complexity?, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 521 (2005); Priya P. Lele & Mathias 
M. Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17 (2007). 
 76. See, e.g., the labor regulation dataset described by Botero et al., supra note 23. 
 77. In addition, we have constructed a labor regulation dataset for the same five 
countries and thirty-six-year period. For accounts of this dataset, analysis of which is beyond 
the scope of the current paper, see Simon Deakin, Priya Lele & Mathias Siems, The Evolution 
of Labour Law: Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory Regimes, 146 INT’L LAB. REV. 133 
(2007); John Armour, Simon Deakin, Priya Lele & Mathias Siems, How Do Legal Rules 
Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker 
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In the second stage, we constructed datasets for a wider range of 
developing, developed, and transition systems—twenty-five in all—in 
each case using a reduced-form index and covering a more limited 
time period, 1995 to 2005. This was a period during which most 
countries were liberalizing their economies and adjusting their 
regulatory frameworks with a view to promoting private-sector 
activity and the globalization of markets. It was also a time of 
sustained economic growth for most systems, although with some 
interruptions and shocks, including the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
to 1998 and the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2000 to 2001. 
Our reduced-form indices for shareholder and creditor protection 
contain ten variables each, so that we have (10 + 10) * 11 * 25 = 
5,500 observations. Because they contain fewer variables, they do 
not capture the same range of information as the extended indices 
for the five-country studies. While covering broadly the same areas of 
law as the five-country datasets, they also address what we consider 
to have particularly salient legal issues relating to shareholder and 
creditor protection in the decade after 1995. For example, the 
twenty-five country shareholder protection dataset focuses on change 
in certain corporate governance standards, such as the presence of 
independent directors on boards and the mandatory bid rule in 
takeover bids, which were widely associated with global “best 
practice” in this period, and which were incorporated in relevant 
international standards such as the OECD’s corporate governance 
Principles.78 
B. Coding the Law 
Our approach to coding has been informed by some of the same 
methodological considerations that influenced our selection of 
variables. We have thus taken into account the variety of different 
legal techniques available to legislators, ranging from mandatory 
norms to default rules of different kinds. In order to capture the 
differing degrees of bindingness implied by these techniques, we use 
graduated variables with scores between 0 and 1 in appropriate cases, 
rather than simple binary codings. We also code not just for 
“positive” legal rules, but for standards found in “soft-law” sources 
such as corporate governance codes, stock exchange rules, and 
 
Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 579–630 (2009). 
 78.  OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004). 
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takeover codes.79 Market participants often regard standards of this 
type as having the same binding effects as laws, and legislators often 
defer to industry-level self-regulation on the understanding that 
resort to statutory solutions may be possible if self-regulatory norms 
prove to be ineffective.80 
C. Illustrations: The Twenty-Five Country Indices for Shareholder and 
Creditor Protection 
The definitions of the variables, the coding protocols, the values 
arrived at through the process of coding, and the detailed legal 
explanations for these values are available online for each of our 
datasets.81 A previous paper82 has set out in detail the basis for the 
coding of the laws in the five-country datasets. To illustrate our 
methodology we will focus here on the content of the twenty-five-
country indices for shareholder protection83 and creditor protection, 
and on the way in which the codings were determined in two 
particular cases, those of the United Kingdom (for shareholder 
protection) and France (for creditor protection). 
1. The twenty-five country shareholder protection index 
The first variable, powers of the general meeting for de facto 
changes, relates to the ability of the shareholders as a collective body 
to control actions by the board that may substantially alter the 
company’s business profile. The corporate laws of many countries 
require transactions that exceed a threshold based on a proportion of 
the company’s net assets to be approved by the shareholders. If there 
is no such threshold, a score of 0 is given. If there is a restriction 
triggered at a threshold of 50% or lower, then a score of 1 is given. If 
there is a restriction, but it is triggered at a net asset threshold that is 
 
 79.  See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 39, at 39. 
 80.  See Lele & Siems, supra note 75, for discussion of this point in the context of the 
coding of the shareholder protection index. 
 81.  See http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.html (home-
page of the “Law, Finance and Development” project on the Cambridge Centre for Business 
Research website). 
 82. Armour et al., supra note 77. 
 83.  The index used to construct the twenty-five-country dataset is also described (more 
briefly) in John Armour, Simon Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar, Mathias Siems & Ajit Singh, 
Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins 
Hypothesis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 343, 343–81 (2009). 
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higher than 50% (e.g. 80%), then a score of 0.5 is given. In the UK, 
the Listing Rules, which apply to publicly traded firms, specify that 
any transaction involving more than 25% of the company’s net assets 
must be approved by the shareholders; this rule was present for the 
entire period 1995–2005.84 Hence, a score of 1 is given for each 
year. 
The second variable, agenda setting power, relates to the ability of 
a minority shareholder to have an item put on the agenda for a 
shareholders’ meeting. The higher the minimum percentage required 
to have an item put on the agenda, the lower the coded score. For 
the entire period, the United Kingdom’s Companies Act of 1985 
stipulated that a shareholder with 5% or more of the voting rights 
could have an item put on the agenda for a shareholder meeting.85 
This yields a coding of 0.5 for each year in the period under study. 
Our third variable, anticipation of shareholder decision, seeks to 
capture the extent to which the legal regime facilitates participation 
in shareholder decision making by those who are unable physically to 
be present at the meeting. This can be done either by permitting 
postal voting, or by allowing shareholders to appoint a proxy to 
represent them in voting at the meeting. Proxy mechanisms can, 
however, be biased in favor of the board of directors unless the 
proxies are “two-way”—that is, they provide for voting both for and 
against the resolution in question. Moreover, we assume that proxy 
facilities are more useful to shareholders when accompanied by a 
“proxy solicitation”—namely, a circular explaining the background 
to the particular resolutions in relation to which proxy appointments 
are sought. In the UK, the Listing Rules required that a two-way 
proxy form be circulated to shareholders for the entire period under 
consideration, but there was no requirement that it be accompanied 
by a proxy solicitation.86 Hence, we code the UK as 0.5 for the 
entire period. 
Fourth, we consider whether, and if so, how readily, multiple 
voting rights are permitted—or, put the other way around, whether a 
one-share-one-vote rule is applied. Multiple voting rights facilitate 
the aggregation of control in the hands of shareholders with less 
than equivalent cash-flow rights, and correspondingly disenfranchise 
 
 84.  UK Listing Rules § 6.3.4 (1984); UK Listing Rules § 10.37 (1993). 
 85.  Companies Act, 1948, § 140; Companies Act, 1985, §§ 376, 377.  
 86.  UK Listing Rules § 5.36 (1984); UK Listing Rules § 13.28(a), (b) (1984). 
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shareholders who do not share the enhanced voting capability. In the 
UK, there has been no legal or other regulatory prohibition of 
multiple voting rights for the period under consideration, meriting a 
score of 0.87 
Our fifth variable relates to the proportion of independent board 
members—that is, those who must be free of employment or 
ownership links to the firm. Independent directors are widely 
thought to be able to assist shareholders in controlling the actions of 
managers. We give a score of 1 for jurisdictions in which more than 
50% of the board must be independent; a score of 0.5 for 
jurisdictions in which more than 25% but less than 50% must be 
independent; and 0 for no requirement relating to independence. 
For intermediate positions, the score is derived as the percentage of 
independent board members divided by two. In the UK, the 
Cadbury Code of Corporate Governance, introduced in 1992, 
required listed companies to ensure that at least a majority of their 
nonexecutive directors be independent. As, at that point, typically 
half the board would be nonexecutive directors, we code this as 
0.25. The Combined Code of Corporate Governance 2003 raised 
the threshold, requiring that at least half of all the board members be 
independent. We therefore code the UK as 1 from the following year 
(2004) onward.88  
The sixth variable relates to the feasibility of directors’ dismissal—
that is, how readily shareholders may remove board members from 
their positions. The highest score of 1 is given where directors may 
be dismissed by shareholders at will, and 0 is given where dismissal 
may only be effected for cause or an important reason (specified in 
the law). Intermediate scores are given where although directors may 
be dismissed at will, this may be accompanied by a financial penalty 
for the company. Such penalties would be higher where there is no 
limit to the duration of service contracts, for which a score of 0.5 is 
given, and lower where there is a fixed duration, for which a score of 
 
 87.  On the admissibility (in principle) of multiple voting rights, see Bushell v. Faith, 
[1970] A.C. 1099. Multiple voting rights are rarely observed in UK listed companies, but this 
appears to be the result of a widely observed social norm, which reflects institutional investor 
opinion on the issue, rather than any legal rule.  
 88. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, THE CODE OF BEST PRACTICE § 2.2 (1992) (majority of nonexecutive 
directors must be independent); FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, COMBINED CODE ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § A.3.2 (2003) (at least half the board members must be 
independent). 
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0.75 is given. Turning to the UK application, no restrictions were 
imposed on shareholders’ ability to remove directors from office 
during the study period, but it was possible for directors to enter 
into service contracts with the firm that contained termination 
payments, thereby subjecting the company to financial liability. From 
1992 to 1995, these were subject to a restriction under the Cadbury 
Code on Corporate Governance to the effect that the general 
meeting had to approve any service contract for more than a three-
year term. In 1995, this was reduced to an outright restriction on 
notice periods of more than one year.89 The position is thus one in 
which dismissal is fundamentally straightforward, with the possibility 
of a financial penalty that is capped by the length of the notice 
period. We code this variable as 0.75 for 1995, and then, to reflect 
the reduction in the maximum notice period, 0.875 for the 
remainder of the study period. 
Seventh, we consider the ability of minority shareholders to 
bring an action to enforce breaches of directors’ duties—that is, the 
extent to which private enforcement is facilitated. Here we code as 0 
those laws which exclude the possibility of a shareholder suit, 0.5 
where there are some restrictions—such as a requirement that the 
shareholder holds some minimum proportion of the voting rights—
and 1 where such an action may be brought readily. In the UK, a 
minority shareholder action does not depend on having a minimum 
share qualification but nevertheless is subject to a significant 
restriction that the wrong must be sufficiently serious as to constitute 
a “fraud on the minority.” Consequently, a minority shareholder 
may enforce only particularly egregious breaches of duty—
misappropriation of assets and the like.90 We therefore code this as 
0.5 for the entire period. 
Eighth, we consider the ability of shareholders to file a personal 
action against a resolution of the general meeting—for example, on 
the basis that it has not been lawfully constituted. Under UK law, 
every shareholder has the power to bring a personal action,91 and so 
 
 89.  This provision originated in the 1995 version of the Code drawn up by the 
Greenbury Committee and became part of the Combined Code drawn up by the Hampel 
Committee in 1998. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FINAL REPORT, § 4.9 
(1998). 
 90.  For an overview of this complex area, see A.J. BOYLE, MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS’ REMEDIES (2002). 
 91.  See, e.g., Edwards v. Halliwell, [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064, 1067. 
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a coding of 1 is accorded for the entire period. In other jurisdictions, 
codings of less than 1 are given where specific percentage thresholds 
are imposed to bring such actions. 
The penultimate variable relates to mandatory bid requirements. 
These compel the purchaser of more than a stipulated proportion of 
the voting rights of a listed company’s share capital to make a tender 
offer for the remaining shares at a price no lower than that paid for 
the initial acquisitions. Such rules are intended to protect minority 
shareholders by providing them with the option to exit the 
company—at a price no lower than that which has been paid for the 
acquisition of a controlling block—rather than be required to 
continue to participate in the firm under the control of the acquirer. 
We reason that a lower threshold acquisition level accords greater 
protection. In the UK, a mandatory bid requirement was triggered 
under the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers for the entire period 
following the acquisition of 30% of the voting rights,92 which we 
code as 1. 
Finally, we consider rules requiring disclosure of share ownership 
blocks. These allow investors to know who has amassed significant 
stakes in a firm. We reason that greater transparency in this 
dimension benefits investors. We give the highest score of 1 for a 3% 
threshold, 0.75 for 5%, 0.5 for 10%, 0.25 for 25% and 0 for anything 
less. In the UK, disclosure of blocks amounting to 3% or more of the 
voting rights has been mandatory since 1989, meaning that we code 
this variable as 1 for the entire period.93 
 
2. The twenty-five country creditor protection index 
 
The first variable codifies rules on minimum share capital. These 
tend to be regulated by law and fixed at different levels, depending 
on the type of the company concerned. In continental European 
countries, and civil law systems in general, this instrument has been 
widely relied upon for the protection of creditors’ interests. Our 
approach to coding concentrates on the minimum capital required 
for establishing a private company, interpreted to mean any business 
vehicle having separate legal personality and providing all its equity 
investors with limited liability. A score of 1 has been assigned to the 
 
 92.  City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, rule 9.1. 
 93.  Companies Act, 1985, § 199(2)(a) (as amended by the Companies Act, 1989). 
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law of countries where the minimum capital is fixed at €25,000 or 
more, a score of 0 in case of no minimum capital requirements, and a 
proportional intermediate score in case of a minimum capital set 
between €25,000 and 0. In France, the coding for this variable was 
done with regard to the private limited liability corporate form of the 
SARL (Société à responsabilité limitée). Up to the end of 2003, the 
law94 required a minimum capital of 50,000FF (equivalent to 
approximately €7,500) in order to form such company, while from 
January 1, 2004 onwards, a SARL could be set up with no minimum 
capital whatsoever.95 Therefore, the score for the years 1995 to 2003 
is 0.3, while for the remaining period (2004-2005) it decreases to 0. 
The second variable, dividend restriction, measures creditor 
protection by reference to the degree the company has power to 
distribute dividends to shareholders. The variable assigns a score of 
0.33 for each of the following provisions: rules on basic dividend 
payments with limitations on the maximum amount of accumulated 
net profit that can be distributed as dividends and/or mandatory 
dividends; restrictions against share repurchase; and rules against 
disguised dividend distribution. In France, Article L 225-210 of the 
Commercial Code96 deals with basic dividend restrictions, defining 
non-distributable reserves and stating that a company must have 
reserves, other than the statutory reserve fund, amounting to at least 
the value of all its shares. Article L 225-209 of the Commercial 
Code97 regulates the acquisition by the company of its own shares, 
by providing that the general meeting of a company whose shares are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market may authorize the board 
of directors or the executive board, as applicable, to purchase a 
number of shares representing up to 10% of the company’s capital. 
In doing so, the general meeting must define the purposes and terms 
of the transaction, as well as its upper limit, and cannot give such 
authorization for a period longer than eighteen months. Finally, 
Articles L 232-11 and L 232-12 regulate disguised dividend 
distributions. Given the presence of these three forms of dividend 
restriction, and after assigning a score of 0.33 for Article L 225-210 
and Article L 225-209 and a score of 0.17 for Article L 232-11, 12, 
the overall coding is 0.83. 
 
 94. Loi n° 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 sur les sociétés commerciales, art. 35. 
 95. Art. L 223-2, derived from Loi n° 2003-721 du 1 août 2003, art. 1. 
 96. Ex art. 217-3, Loi n° 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966. 
 97. Loi n° 2003-7 du 3 janvier 2003, art. 50 (II). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/26/2010 1:14 PM 
1435 Law and Financial Development 
 1463 
The third variable addresses the issue of directors’ duties towards 
creditors. This variable is geared towards the situation of bankruptcy, 
and gives a score of 1 when a director has a duty to act in creditors’ 
interests when the company is balance-sheet insolvent. A score of 0.5 
is given where the duty is owed in the case of a commercially 
insolvent company, and, finally, a coding of 0 is given where there is 
no duty to account for creditors’ interests in these situations. In 
France, the Commercial Code at Article L 624-3 rules that, where 
managerial negligence contributed to a depletion of corporate assets, 
the court may order that all or some of the debts of the company be 
borne by its directors. In addition, Article L 624-5 enumerates the 
circumstances in which the court may institute an administrative 
order or winding-up proceedings against any (paid or unpaid, de jure 
or de facto) directors. These situations include those in which the 
directors have disposed of the assets of the legal person as their own 
property, used the assets or credit of the legal person to the 
detriment of its interests either for personal gain or to benefit 
another legal person or undertaking in which they had a direct or 
indirect interest, abusively pursued a loss-making operation which 
was bound to result in the insolvency of the legal person, kept 
fictitious accounts or removed accounting documents from the legal 
person, or failed to keep accounts required by law. Because of these 
stringent laws, the coding is 1 for the entire period.  
The fourth variable relates to the possibility offered in various 
countries of granting nonpossessory security interests to secure present 
and/or future debts, thereby providing a security interest in present 
and future, tangible and intangible collateral. It is well established 
that most, if not all, jurisdictions allow a nonpossessory security to be 
taken over land. Our coding assigns a score of 0.33 in the case where 
the law allows the creation of such security interests regarding 
personalty (tangible movables), receivables (intangibles), and “all 
assets.” In France, with regard to personalty, nonpossessory security 
interests are not generally possible over inventory: the most common 
form is, instead, the pledge, which requires dispossession of the 
debtor. Yet, charges are possible over certain assets, including a 
purchase money security interest over material and equipment.98 
With regard to receivables, the “Loi Dailly” of 1981 establishes a 
 
 98. See Martin Gdanski, Taking Security in France, in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY AND 
INSOLVENCY 59, 64–68 (Michael Bridge & Robert Stevens eds., 2001). 
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statutory framework specifically for the grant of security over book 
debts. With regard to “all assets,” it is believed that the notion of a 
“floating charge” is foreign to French law,99 although it is possible to 
create a comprehensive pledge, which includes the commercial name, 
goodwill, and intellectual property, but excludes real estate, book 
debts, inventory, and contractual rights, over the so called “fond de 
commerce.”100 For these reasons, the score attributed to this variable 
is 0.66. 
The fifth variable expands on the fourth and relates to the 
registration of the type of nonpossessory security interests just 
referenced. In France, registration is required for security over 
corporeal moveables,101 but not for incorporeal assets,102 therefore 
the coding is 0.33. 
The sixth variable is concerned with how far the law allows 
creditors to carry out out-of-court enforcement of security interests. 
Where they have this power, the score is 1; where they can only act 
through a court order, a score of 0 is given. As for most creditors, 
out-of-court enforcement or settlement saves time, cost, and human 
resources. This possibility is viewed as enhancing creditor protection. 
In France, out-of-court enforcement is not possible103 and the 
coding is 0. 
The seventh variable relates to the degree of power to commence 
bankruptcy proceedings. The variable assigns different scores to the 
cases of a debtor being able to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding 
unilaterally without any insolvency requirement (when the score will 
be 0), a debtor being required to initiate bankruptcy proceedings 
when the company is balance-sheet insolvent (when the score will be 
1), and a bankruptcy proceeding being initiated by any creditor able 
to show that the debtor is insolvent by reference to a relevant 
criterion (when the score will be 0.5). This variable, therefore, 
captures the power of the debtor to use bankruptcy as a threat 
against creditors and, conversely, the power of the creditors to use 
bankruptcy as a way to compel payment. In France, for the period 
considered, the Commercial Code envisages that any single creditor 
may commence an insolvency proceeding, while in the case where 
 
 99. Id. at 59. 
 100. Id. at 65–66. 
 101. Art. 2338 C. CIV. 
 102. Art. 2361 C. CIV. 
 103. Gdanski, supra note 98, at 79. 
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the proceeding is started by the debtor, a cash-flow test is deemed to 
be sufficient, with the criterion being whether the debtor is unable 
to meet its liabilities out of its disposable assets.104 Hence, the score 
is 0.5. 
The eighth variable relates to the issue of the stay of secured 
creditors in insolvency proceedings. It distinguishes between 
situations according to how far there is a compulsory stay where 
there is a feasible prospect of a corporate rescue or rehabilitation. In 
France, Commercial Code, Article L 621-40 provides for secured 
creditors to be stayed: the decision to commence insolvency 
proceedings prevents any legal action or any application for 
execution against either the real or personal property of the debtor 
by any of the creditors whose debts arose before the date of said 
decision. This provision must, however, be read together with Article 
L 622-23, which rules that secured creditors may nevertheless 
exercise individual enforcement in liquidation, if the liquidator has 
not sold the assets within three months from the judgment 
instituting or ordering a court-ordered winding-up. The coding is 
therefore 0.5. 
The ninth variable, outcome of bankruptcy proceedings, relates to 
how and by whom decisions are made regarding whether a bankrupt 
firm continues in operation or has to close down. Where the law 
grants that role to the court or to the debtor, the score assigned is 0. 
In situations where the power to decide the outcome of the 
bankruptcy proceeding is granted primarily to the creditors, the 
score will be 1 if the decision rights are allocated to the residual 
claimants and 0.5 if the law makes no such specification. In France, 
the Commercial Code provides for the court to be the primary 
decision maker regarding the outcome of the proceeding,105 and so 
the coding is 0. 
The final variable is concerned with the rank order of secured 
creditors during an insolvency proceeding. The division of security 
interests set out here refers back to the fourth variable, and a coding 
of 0.25 is assigned for each type of secured creditors who are not 
 
 104. Arts. L 620-2, 621-1. 
 105. Art. L 621-62; see also Arts. L 621-60, 621-61 (explaining that the judicial 
administrator, in preparing the report, must consult with creditors and employees; the report is 
influential with respect to the court’s decision in the case. This provision was introduced by 
Loi n° 94-475 du 10 juin 1994 relative à la prévention et au traitement des difficultés des 
entreprises, Official Journal 134 du 11 juin 1994, p. 8440, in force 21 Oct. 1994). 
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subordinated by law to preferred claims. In France, the Commercial 
Code, at Article L 621-32 II, provides that debts secured by specific 
charges over real or personal property are not subordinated in 
liquidation.106 The score for this variable is, therefore, 0.75. 
D. Issues Arising in the Econometric Analysis of Longitudinal Data 
As we shall see in more detail in the next section, the 
presentation of longitudinal data collated in the ways just described 
can be highly revealing at a purely descriptive level. In addition, once 
data exist in this form, it becomes possible to undertake econometric 
analysis aimed at identifying the presence of correlations between 
legal and economic variables. Time-series and panel-data techniques 
can be deployed to identify causal relationships in ways that are not 
possible if cross-sectional data (referring to the state of the law only 
at a particular point in time) are used. However, these techniques are 
not straightforward and their use can give rise to difficult issues of 
interpretation. 
In cross-sectional analyses, a statistically significant correlation 
between an explanatory or “independent” variable, which codes for 
legal rules, on the one hand, and an outcome or “dependent” 
economic variable, on the other, will not necessarily provide good 
evidence of the direction of causal influence. The explanatory 
variable may be “endogenous” to the outcome variable in the 
technical sense of correlation with the error term in the regression 
equation. Where this is the case, a false result may occur; for 
example, it could be the case that a given financial indicator is 
driving a change in the law rather than the other way round.107 
There are a number of techniques available for getting around 
this problem of “reverse” or “simultaneous” causation. One is to 
identify a so-called “instrumental variable” that is correlated with the 
explanatory variable, but is not correlated with the error term. For 
example, in the early legal origins literature, scholars used the 
 
 106. Introduced by Loi n° 94-475 du 10 juin 1994 relative à la prévention et au 
traitement des difficultés des entreprises, Official Journal 134 du 11 juin 1994, p. 8440, in 
force 21 Oct. 1994. 
 107.  For a general review of problems of endogeneity in growth regressions of the kind 
which are commonly used in the development literature, see Dani Rodrik, Why We Learn 
Nothing from Regressing Economic Growth on Policies (Mar. 25, 2005) (Harvard Univ., 
Working Paper), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/polocy%20regressions. 
pdf. 
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common law or civil law origins of different countries’ legal systems 
as instruments for the substance of legal rules on shareholder rights. 
The assumption was that legal origin likely correlated with the 
content of legal rules in these countries; but, conversely, that legal 
origin could not plausibly have been influenced by the economic 
outcome variables, which were the focus of interest (and so could 
not be correlated with the error term). As we have seen,108 this was 
because LLSV took the view that most countries’ legal origins were 
the result of external events such as colonization or conquest that 
had occurred several decades or even centuries before, rather than 
being generated by contemporaneous, country-specific economic 
forces. By demonstrating a statistical relationship between legal 
origin and the different outcome variables, they were able to claim 
that the direction of causation ran from law to the economy rather 
than vice versa.109  
However, there are problems with the instrumental variable 
approach. Not only is a degree of subjective judgment involved in 
the choice of instrumental variables; a variable will not be a good 
instrument if it could have influenced outcomes through channels 
other than that of the proposed explanatory variable. As we have 
seen, LLSV have more recently come to the view that legal origin 
might be influencing the economy through a number of routes, 
including interpretive practices and approaches to enforcement, in 
addition to that of the content of legal rules. This is the basis on 
which they have proposed that legal origin should be seen as a causal 
or exogenous variable in its own right, rather than as an instrument 
for the content of legal rules.110 As noted above,111 this approach 
creates new difficulties since it rests on the questionable assumption 
that legal origin, understood as regulatory style, is not susceptible to 
feedback effects from the economic environment. 
Once longitudinal data become available, a wider range of 
econometric techniques can be used to address the issue of causal 
inference. Time series datasets may possess a characteristic known as 
“nonstationarity.” These are series that do not follow a regular path, 
but are prone to irregular deviations, without returning to the 
previous trend. Where one or both of two time series is 
 
 108.  See id. 
 109.  La Porta et al., 1998, supra note 5. 
 110.  La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 298. 
 111.  See Rodrik, supra note 107.  
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nonstationary in this sense, their error terms are liable to 
autocorrelate, again producing spurious regressions. Techniques for 
addressing the issue of stationarity through the identification of 
“cointegrated” time series—that is to say, times series which are 
individually nonstationary, but are linked by a common, stationary 
trend—were developed in the 1980s.112 These techniques were later 
combined with methods designed to make it possible to draw causal 
inferences from correlations in time-series analysis. These mostly 
involve variants of so-called “Granger causality” techniques,113 
which, in their basic form, involve regressing current values of the 
outcome variable against past values of itself and of the explanatory 
variable. If the addition of the past values of the explanatory variable 
makes a difference to the result, causation is generally assumed, 
although it may be more accurate to think of the effect in terms of 
precedence. Cointegration-based techniques are thought to be 
appropriate where there is a very long time series; conventionally, at 
least twenty-five years of annualized data are required. For shorter 
time periods, panel-data techniques can be used to identify the 
existence of correlations between legal and economic variables in 
pooled samples of countries, and Granger causality tests can be 
deployed to throw light on the direction of causation. 
Our five-country datasets, with their very long time series, are 
nonstationary in the sense just described, and cointegration 
techniques have been used, as we shall see in more detail below, to 
deal with the possibility of autocorrelation and to identify causal 
relationships. For the twenty-five-country dataset, with its shorter 
time period, we have used panel data techniques in conjunction with 
Granger causality tests.114 
 
 112. Robert Engle & Clive Granger, Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, 
Estimation, and Testing, 55 ECONOMETRICA 251 (1987). 
 113.  See Clive Granger, Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-
Spectral Methods, 37 ECONOMETRICA 424 (1969). 
 114.  For further details of the panel-data techniques used (in this case involving a 
random-effects model that is intended to take into account the likelihood that there are 
unobserved effects that vary both across countries and across time), see Armour et al., supra 
note 75. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Leximetric Analysis 
We are now in a position to present our empirical findings. We 
begin with a “leximetric” account, which provides a description of 
the main trends in legal change that we can identify from our data.  
1. Analysis of five countries, 1970-2005 
The five-country datasets track the evolution of shareholder and 
creditor protection between 1970 and 2005 in the UK, the United 
States, France, Germany, and India. Aggregating all the variables 
shows how well these legal systems have protected shareholder and 
creditor rights over time (see Figures 3 and 4). 
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Figure 4: Aggregate Creditor Protection  
(44 variables) 
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A number of differences between shareholder and creditor 
protection can be identified. First, shareholder protection has 
increased in all countries, whereas the development of creditor 
protection does not show a clear trend. Second, the UK and 
Germany have strengthened protection for both shareholders and 
creditors over this period, whereas France, India, and the United 
States have a lower level of protection for creditors at the end of the 
period than at the beginning. Third, shareholder protection has 
tended to go up incremental steps, whereas the curves on creditor 
protection have clearer “plateaus” and “steps,” indicating that 
change is more episodic and, when it occurs, far-reaching. 
These observations are not compatible with a legal origin effect, 
which is time-invariant and constant across closely related areas of 
law. The rank order of the countries changes over time, and there are 
very different pictures with respect to shareholder protection and 
creditor protection. The substance of our findings also differs from 
those of LLSV. We do not find that shareholders and creditors are 
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better protected in common law countries than in civil law ones. Nor 
does the pace of change seem to differ with regard to these two 
broad categories of legal system. 
The overall aggregates only provide a highly generalized picture. 
It is possible to break our results down by reference to particular 
subcategories within each of the main indices. In the case of the 
shareholder protection index, we can consider two subcategories, 
concerning protection of shareholders against boards and 
management and protection against other shareholders 
respectively.115 Table 1 presents summary data for these two sub-
categories on a country-by-country basis (the deeper shading 
indicates higher scores). For creditor protection we can distinguish 
between rules that take effect by limiting the freedom of the debtor 
firm to engage in activities that may harm creditors, rules that take 
effect by facilitating creditor contracting for greater protection, and 
rules that take effect by facilitating creditor power in bankruptcy 
proceedings.116 The results of the scores for these subcategories are 
summarized in Table 2 on a country-by-country basis.  
 
 115. Lele & Siems, supra note 75. 
 116. Armour et al., supra note 77. 
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Table 1: Shareholder Protection in Five Countries 1970-2005:  
Mean (and Standard Deviation) 
 
 Protection against 
boards and 
management  
(42 variables) 
Protection against 
other shareholders  
(18 variables) 
France 22.55 (3.12) 9.63 (0.71) 
Germany 21.56 (2.03) 10.26 (0.65) 
India 23.06 (2.18) 8.27 (0.70) 
UK 23.27 (3.44) 8.20 (0.38) 
U.S. 21.24 (1.90) 8.69 (0.86) 
 
Table 2: Creditor Protection in Five Countries 1970-2005:  
Mean (and Standard Deviation) 
 
 Debtor control
(15 variables) 
Credit contracts
(10 variables) 
Insolvency 
(19 variables) 
France 7.03 (0.17) 4.08 (0.64) 9.26 (1.51) 
Germany 11.61 (0.71) 7.06 (0.11) 12.82 (0.66) 
India 4.02 (0.14) 7.41 (0.57) 10.33 (1.95) 
UK 7.33 (1.90) 7.97 (0.71) 12.78 (0.71) 
U.S. 6.06 (1.22) 7.88 (0.65) 8.56 (0.97) 
 
————————————————————————————— 
Related papers have discussed the trends in the subindices in 
some detail,117 so we will only summarize the main findings here. 
Once the main indices are broken down into their component parts, 
we can see that countries can arrive at similar levels of protection 
overall, through different methods. For example, in the United 
States and the UK, creditors have a comparative advantage in 
mechanisms that facilitate contracting for greater protection, whereas 
in Germany creditors are better protected than in other countries 
mainly through controls over debtor activities (see Table 2).  
In shareholder protection, we would expect to find that rules 
protecting minority shareholders against expropriation by majorities 
would be stronger in jurisdictions in which share ownership was 
concentrated in the hands of blockholders (Germany, France, and 
 
 117. See Armour et al., supra note 77; Lele & Siems, supra note 75.  
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India), and that rules protecting shareholders against boards would 
receive more emphasis in jurisdictions in which dispersed ownership 
is the norm (the UK and the United States). Table 1 suggests that 
France and Germany provide higher than average “minority-
majority” protection, but that India does not. This suggests that 
legal origin may be a force for inertia; India’s common law heritage 
may not have been equipped as well to adopt laws that tend to be 
found in civilian regimes for governing minority-majority conflicts. 
On the other hand, we find that the average level of protection for 
external shareholders against boards and management is strongest in 
the UK but weakest in the United States. A supposedly core feature 
of “Anglo-Saxon” corporate law seems to be only weakly present in 
the American case, by comparison with the practice in civilian 
countries. Another way of interpreting this result is that two of the 
parent civil law regimes, France and Germany, were strengthening 
the position of minority shareholders with regard to boards and 
managers over the period of the study, as was the UK, while this 
aspect of U.S. law changed hardly at all prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002. 
2. Analysis of twenty-five countries, 1995–2005 
In Figures 5 through 12 we present our twenty-five-country data 
by reference to the principal legal origin “families” of English, 
French, and German law, and a fourth category consisting of 
transition systems, all of which, in this sample, are of German 
origin.118 For this purpose, we mostly adopt the classifications of 
systems used by LLSV. Some of these classifications are problematic, 
for reasons explored earlier,119 but this mode of presentation may be 
useful for comparing our results with LLSV’s. 
 
 118.  While most transition systems (and all of those in the current sample) can be 
categorized as having a German-law origin, there is a case for treating them separately from the 
other categories since their recent evolution has been considerably influenced by American, 
English, and French law, as well as German law. There is also some residual “socialist law” 
influence. On the category of “socialist law,” see La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 288.  
 119.  ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 39, at 279, 281. Zweigert and Kötz treat the 
Scandinavian systems as a separate category because they are not based on a single civil code 
model as can be said of the French and German systems. In practice, the Scandinavian systems 
have been heavily influenced by German law. In fact, we categorize them as German-origin 
systems for present purposes, while recognizing that this classification (like all those involving 
legal “families”) is open to question. See discussion supra Part II. 
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Figure 5: Shareholder protection in  
English legal origin countries    (10 variables)
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The results for shareholder protection indicate a generally rising 
trend over the period covered. All systems have improved their 
general level of shareholder protection, with certain variables, 
particularly those relating to independent board membership and the 
mandatory bid rule in hostile takeover bids, showing rapid increases. 
In that sense there has been convergence around standards which 
originated in the common law systems, particularly the UK, and 
which in the course of the 1990s and 2000s have come to be 
associated with global “best practice.”120 There are, however, some 
divergences by reference to legal origin and to the state of transition 
and development of the different countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120.  While the notion of global “best practice” in corporate governance is necessarily a 
rather vague one, it may be relevant to note that the OECD’s PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 78, gives prominence to standards on independent boards and the 
role of the mandatory bid rule in takeover bids (which, by requiring the bidder to make an 
offer for the entire share capital of the company once his holding reaches a certain level, is 
intended to protect minority shareholders against expropriation). For further discussion, see 
Armour et al., supra note 77. 
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Figure 7: Shareholder protection in 
German legal origin countries  (10 variables)  
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Figure 6: Shareholder protection in  
French legal origin countries  (10 variables)  
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Figure 8: Shareholder protection in 
transition countries  (10 variables)  
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The general rise in protection suggests that legal origin has not 
been a barrier to convergence and, indeed, it is the case that, on 
average, both developed and developing civil law countries had a 
faster rate of increase than common law ones. When we break down 
the sample into individual legal “families,” however, certain 
differences emerge. The English-origin systems have above average 
scores for variables 1, 3, 5, and 7, which refer respectively to the 
powers of the general meeting to control transactions entered into 
by the board, the power of shareholders to take part in decision 
making without being physically present at meetings, requirements 
for independent directors on the board, and the availability of 
derivative suits to enforce directors’ duties. These are all indicators of 
corporate law regimes in which the main problem is the possibility of 
expropriation of shareholder interests by powerful boards or 
managers. 
In French legal-origin systems, the pattern just indicated is 
reversed: variables 1, 3, 5, and 7 have relatively low scores. 
Strikingly, France itself is an outlier in this group, indicating that the 
high level of shareholder protection rights in the parent system has 
not so far transmitted itself to other members of the group. One 
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possible interpretation of this result is that legal origin is not a strong 
force here, and that the very concept of a French-origin “family” 
makes little sense in this context. An alternative view is that the civil 
law tradition is proving to be a greater obstacle to convergence 
outside France than in the system of origin. This seems paradoxical—
why should the parent system have been quicker to converge on 
global corporate governance standards than the rest? One possibility 
is that a certain regulatory style may be better suited to local 
conditions in the parent system, alongside which it will have 
coevolved,121 than in systems into which it has been transplanted.122  
German legal-origin systems score strongly on variable 8, which 
is concerned with the power of minority shareholders to block a 
resolution of the general meeting. This is not surprising, since such a 
power would provide an important mechanism for shareholder 
protection in systems with blockholder forms of ownership. German-
origin scores are nevertheless up across the board. In 1995, the 
scores for German legal-origin systems were below the average for 
the whole sample; by the end of the period, they were above it. 
Scores for developing countries are, on average, below those for 
developed ones in both the common law and civil law countries, 
while transition systems also have below average scores in relation to 
the sample as a whole. However, some transition systems are among 
those undergoing the most rapid movement towards a more 
shareholder-protective regime, under the influence of external 
pressures. The jump in the Russian score indicates the influence of 
Western (and, specifically, Anglo-American) models for the Joint 
Stock Company Law of 1995, while the more incremental rises in 
the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Slovenia are driven in part by the 
adoption of European Community law standards.123  
 
 121.  For a discussion on coevolution, see Part II above. 
 122.  There is substantial literature on the difficulties involved in the transplantation of 
legal institutions. See Dan Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The 
Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003); Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan 
Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country 
Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791 (2003). According to Botero et al., supra note 
23, at 1346, “path dependence in the legal and regulatory styles emerges as an efficient 
adaptation to the previously transplanted legal infrastructure.”  
 123.  For further analysis of the differences in shareholder protection across countries in 
this dataset, see Armour et al., supra note 77; Siems, supra note 46; Michael Schouten & 
Mathias Siems, The Evolution of Ownership Disclosure Rules across Countries (SSRN Working 
Paper Series, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434144. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/26/2010 1:14 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1478 
The results for the twenty-five-country creditor protection index 
are different from those obtained from the five-country study. With 
this larger sample, certain trends by reference to legal origin become 
clear. There is no overall common law-civil law divide, but there is 
evidence of divergence of experience by reference to the legal 
“families.” French-origin systems have a significantly lower level of 
overall creditor protection than either the English-origin or German-
origin countries. The French-origin countries are strong on dividend 
restrictions (variable 2), but relatively weak on minimum capital 
requirements (variable 1), creditor contract rights (variables 4-6), 
and creditor protection in insolvency (variables 8-10). The English-
origin systems tend to stress creditors’ contract rights and are weak 
on minimum capital requirements and rules governing entry into 
bankruptcy proceedings. German legal-origin countries have high 
scores on minimum capital requirements, rules on entry into 
insolvency, and the priority of secured creditors, and tend not to 
have low scores on any of the variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Creditor protection in 
English legal origin countries (10 variables)  
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Figure 10: Creditor protection in  
French legal origin countries (10 variables)
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Figure 11: Creditor protection in 
German legal origin countries (10 variables)  
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Figure 12: Creditor protection in 
transition countries  (10 variables)  
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1995 2000 2005
China 
Czech R. 
Latvia 
Russia 
Slovenia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the common upwards trend, which is found with 
respect to shareholder protection, is absent in the case of creditor 
rights, most of the countries in the sample have undergone 
bankruptcy law reforms of some kind over the past ten years, with 
several of them initiating attempts to speed up or better regulate 
corporate reorganization procedures. There is a mixed picture on 
minimum capital requirements; France abolished these, effective in 
2004, but most other civil law systems have maintained or 
strengthened this form of protection in the period under review. 
This kind of protection for creditors is generally absent in the 
common law systems. 
Across the sample as a whole, developing and transition systems 
have lower scores than developed ones, but the gap between 
developed and developing/transition systems is less marked than the 
difference between the three legal origin “families.” French legal-
origin developing systems have experienced a greater increase in their 
scores than any group, in both absolute and relative terms. German-
origin developing and transition systems have also increased their 
scores over this period, whereas those for English-origin developing 
systems have changed the least.  
Why do we find evidence of a strong legal origin effect, at least 
by reference to the three main legal “families,” in the case of creditor 
rights when it is missing in the case of shareholder rights? 
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Historically, civil law systems had less extensive systems of security 
interests than common law ones. In the French civil code, only two 
types of security interests were recognized, namely mortgage (for 
nonpossessory interests) and pledge (for possessory ones); these were 
imported directly from Roman law. In French-origin systems, types 
of nonpossessory security interests over property other than land had 
to be introduced through ad hoc statutes aimed at facilitating access 
to credit. While some of these laws included specific provisions for 
registration, others simply relied upon the registration rules already 
provided by the various civil codes. The recognition of security 
interests in the French civil law “family” has tended to remain 
limited and unsystematic. In the German-origin countries, by 
comparison, the courts developed the notion of the “quasi-floating 
charge” by way of transfer of title, and the countries generally took a 
more flexible approach with respect to the protection of secured 
creditors’ rights.124 This is an instance where the division of labor 
between case law and legislation mattered, but interestingly within 
the wider civil law category. 
B. Econometric Analysis 
With time-series data available, it becomes possible to estimate 
the economic impact of legal change and, conversely, to study the 
possible impact of economic conditions on the law. A number of 
econometric studies using the datasets described above have been 
carried out. This is a work in progress, and it is not possible to report 
a complete set of results here. Nevertheless, some trends are 
beginning to emerge from the literature. 
The most striking result is the absence of the expected 
relationship between shareholder protection and stock market 
development. La Porta et al.’s original “law and finance” study 
found that a high score on the antidirector rights index correlated 
with a number of measures of financial development including stock 
market capitalization as a proportion of GDP.125 Fagernäs et al.126 
 
 124.  See generally Hugh S. Pigott, The Need for Harmonisation of Collateral Law in 
Europe, 15 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 871 (2004). 
 125.  La Porta et al., 1998, supra note 5. 
 126. Sonja Fagernäs, Prabirjit Sarkar & Ajit Singh, Legal Origin, Shareholder Protection 
and the Stock Market: New Challenges from Time Series Analysis, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MERGERS 20 (Klaus Gugler & B. Burcin Yurtoglu eds., 
2008).  
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carried out an analysis of the relationship between the five-country 
shareholder protection index for the period 1970-2005 and changes 
in the stock-market turnover ratio for France, Germany, the UK, and 
the U.S. stock market turnover ratios measure the relationship 
between the value of shares traded and stock market capitalization. 
They have risen in each of the four countries in this study since the 
1970s, particularly in France and the United States. In Germany 
there has been a more oscillating pattern with no clear increase in the 
turnover ratio since the mid-1980s.  
Fägernas et al. used the autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) 
approach to cointegration to ascertain the existence of a long run 
relationship between the stock market turnover ratio and the 
shareholder protection index, together with its different 
components. In order to account for the possibility that the overall 
level of the national economy was affecting the stock market 
behavior, they included the log-value of GDP in their model. They 
found that increases in shareholder protection did not appear to have 
had a positive link with stock market development as reflected in the 
stock market turnover ratio, irrespective of legal origin. They found a 
negative relationship between both the index as a whole and its two 
component elements (protection against boards and protection 
against majority shareholders) for France and the UK For Germany 
and the United States, no relationship either way could be identified. 
In a related paper, Sarkar127 carried out similar tests to see if there 
was a relationship between shareholder protection and stock market 
development in India over the same period. No relationship was 
found.  
Armour et al. carried out a panel data analysis to determine 
whether higher scores in the extended-sample shareholder protection 
index are correlated with an increased level of stock market 
development, taking into account a number of other potentially 
relevant factors including the effectiveness of legal enforcement in 
the countries concerned (as measured by the World Bank’s “rule of 
law index”).128 The four measures of stock market development 
 
 127. Prabirjit Sarkar, Corporate Governance, Stock Market Development and Private 
Capital Accumulation: A Case Study of India, in INDIA MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL (S. 
Marjit ed., 2008).  
 128. Armour et al., supra note 83. This study covers only twenty of the twenty-five 
countries now contained in the dataset (as only twenty had been coded at that point). The 
sample of countries analyzed by Armour et al. is similar, in terms of its composition, to that 
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which are available on a longitudinal basis were used: stock market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP; shares traded as a percentage 
of GDP; the ratio of shares traded to real stock market capitalization; 
and the number of listed companies per million of the population. 
Contrary again to the results from LLSV’s cross-sectional study, their 
analysis finds no statistically significant positive correlation between 
shareholder protection and the level of stock market development, 
and a negative correlation in relation to the number of listed 
companies. Granger causality tests showed that the direction of 
causation ran from the increase in shareholder protection to the 
decline in the number of listed companies, not the other way round. 
These are broadly similar results, in terms of their implications for 
the relationship between shareholder protection and stock market 
development, to those obtained by Fagernäs et al.129 and Sarkar130 in 
their analyses of the five-country dataset. 
These findings are open to a number of interpretations. One is 
that they may reflect difficulty in getting clear-cut results from time-
series data, by comparison to cross-sectional analyses. This is refuted 
by the existence of results from other studies using the five-country 
datasets. Analyzing the five-country labor regulation dataset using 
the ARDL approach, Deakin and Sarkar131 found evidence that 
productivity and employment growth are positively correlated with 
the strengthening of certain labor standards (mostly those relating to 
working time and dismissal law) in civil law systems. Similarly, 
Deakin, Demetriades, and James132 report the findings of a 
cointegration analysis of creditor protection datasets for India and 
find evidence that the strengthening of secured creditors’ rights was 
causally related to an increase in banking sector development.  
A second possibility is that our longitudinal datasets are in some 
way defective as an account of legal change. However, by 
comparison to their only significant rivals, the datasets created by 
 
analyzed by La Porta et al. in their first “law and finance” study. La Porta et al., 1998, supra 
note 5; see Armour et al., supra note 83, at 360. 
 129. Fagernäs et al., supra, note 126. 
 130. Sarkar, supra, note 127. 
 131. Simon Deakin & Prabirjit Sarkar, Assessing the Long-Run Economic Impact of Labour 
Law Systems: A Theoretical Reappraisal and Analysis of New Time Series Data, 39 INDUS. REL. 
J. 453 (2008). 
 132. Simon Deakin, Panicos Demetriades & Gregory James, Creditor Rights and 
Banking System Development in India (SSRN Working Paper Series, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1208866. 
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LLSV, they have the advantage of incorporating a wider range of 
legal information and adopting a more flexible approach to coding. 
The codings of civil law countries in our twenty-five-country 
shareholder protection index are significantly higher than those 
provided by LLSV in their “law and finance” paper, and the codings 
of common law systems are, on average, correspondingly lower.133 
We interpret this as evidence for the value of a “functional” approach 
to coding, which seeks to use indicators of potential relevance to a 
range of different country contexts. Put slightly differently, the 
approach avoids “home-country bias.” 
Methodological criticisms aside, it is plausible that our results are 
pointing to findings with real economic significance. The absence of 
a correlation between corporate law reform and stock market 
development suggests that the strengthening of shareholder rights, 
which took place in the 1990s and 2000s, has not been having its 
principal intended effect. This could be because national conditions 
may be setting limits to the effectiveness of legal transplants. Hence, 
while we report substantial formal convergence of laws, our 
econometric results suggest that functional discontinuities persist. 
This result is not incompatible with the legal origins hypothesis, 
particularly in the modified form presented most recently by La 
Porta et al.134 It could be that changes in the substantive content of 
laws, in the form of convergence along the lines of a common law or 
Anglo-American model, have had little impact in the face of a 
relatively unchanging “legal infrastructure” in civil law, developing, 
and transition systems. Legal origin may be working, through 
channels other than those of the formal content of the law, to 
frustrate the intentions of law reformers. 
However, we also need to take into account evidence that is 
weak (at best) for a positive relationship between stock market 
development and the strengthening of shareholder rights in common 
law countries, and not just in civil law and transition ones. In our 
panel data analysis we found that English legal origin was positively 
and significantly associated with one of the four measures of stock 
market development that we were concerned with, namely the 
number of listed companies.135 In the case of the other three 
 
 133. Armour et al., supra note 83, at 356–57. 
 134. La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2. 
 135. Armour et al., supra note 83, at 366–68. 
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variables, there was no significant relationship. In the case of the 
time-series analysis, we found no statistically significant relationship 
in either direction between changes in shareholder rights and the 
stock market turnover ratio for the United States; in the case of 
Britain, we found a statistically significant relationship, but the sign 
was negative. Thus, it would seem that greater shareholder 
protection has not enhanced financial development even in the 
common law systems. It could be that increases in shareholder 
protection on the scale witnessed since the mid-1990s have been 
“too much of a good thing,”136 imposing undue costs and limiting 
the attractiveness of the listed company option. 
With these possible explanations in mind, we are now in a 
position to reassess legal origins theory in the light of our empirical 
results. 
V. THEORETICAL REEVALUATION 
As we have seen, the relationship between investor protection 
rules and the economy has been theorized in a number of ways. The 
legal origins hypothesis posits a causal role for legal institutions in the 
creation of legal rules. Early versions of the theory suggested a 
unidirectional relationship: legal origins, established (in some cases, 
centuries ago) and transplanted through conquest and colonization, 
affected the ways in which countries developed their investor 
protection rules in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. In this view, legal origins were seen as an exogenous 
constraint on the extent to which economic forces and interest group 
politics could shape outcomes.137 This constraint, it was argued, 
could lead to differences in investor protection, which, in turn, 
would lead to differential financial market development. 
By contrast, political economy theories view the content of legal 
rules primarily as a phenomenon engendered by the alignment of 
interest groups.138 In this view, the state of the economy is the 
 
 136. Valentina Bruno & Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can 
There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?, (ECGI-Finance, Working Paper No. 142, 2007) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956329. 
 137. La Porta et al., 1998, supra note 5. 
 138. See, e.g., PETER ALEXIS GOUREVTICH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND 
CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2005); 
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003). 
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ultimate cause of legal change, with economic forces operating 
through the channel of the political system. Thus, financial market 
development stimulates demand for legal protection of investors, not 
the other way around.139  
The existence of a link between particular legal institutions and 
the content or style of legal rules does not, of course, rule out a role 
for political economy. Rather, legal institutions can be understood as 
interacting with interest group politics in the production of legal 
rules.140 The outcome of previous rounds of political settlements will 
affect the current allocation of resources, and consequently the 
relationship between legal rules and the economy can be thought of 
as bi- rather than unidirectional—that is, a “rolling relation.”141 
Legal origins theorists argue that the nature of a country’s legal 
institutions is nevertheless a more significant determinant of investor 
protection (and thence financial market) outcomes than its political 
makeup. The link between origins and rules is thereby viewed as 
being one about the style of regulation142—that is, the processes 
employed to execute outputs from a policy process.  
For economists and development agencies, the most important 
question concerns the extent to which legal institutions affect 
financial market development, whether directly or indirectly. In 
other words, the question is whether differences in regulatory styles 
are associated with differences in the function of resulting legal 
rules—that is, differences in the way in which they actually perform 
in, say, protecting investors and stimulating investment. For 
comparative lawyers, by contrast, understanding simply the existence 
and determinants of differences in the form of legal rules may be of 
interest, even if they are inconsequential for the real economy.143 
Both groups, however, have an interest in clarifying the nature of the 
 
 139. Cheffins, supra note 35; Coffee, supra note 35. 
 140. La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2. 
 141. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT 
CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AROUND THE WORLD (2008). The notion that channels of causation run in both directions 
between legal institutions and the economy may be traced back to Weber. See MAX WEBER, 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (1922). 
 142. Botero, supra note 23. 
 143. On the significance of the difference between the form and the function of legal 
rules, see, for example, Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of 
Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001). 
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law-economy relationship at a conceptual level. Does the empirical 
evidence emerging from time-series datasets assist this process?  
A. The Extent of Path Dependencies by Legal Origin 
1. Legal origins 
Our indexing efforts reveal a number of stylized facts about the 
evolution of investor protection rules. First, within our time period 
there are differences between the content of investor protection rules 
by legal origin. However, the scope of these differences varies 
considerably depending on the type of rule in question. Differences 
in shareholder protection by reference to legal origin are relatively 
modest; moreover, the cross-country differences are much smaller 
than the intertemporal changes in shareholder protection that have 
occurred universally in our sample countries during the study period. 
In creditor protection, however, there are cross-country differences, 
which are persistent over time.144 Moreover, these differences appear 
to be related to legal origins, a result emerging from our more 
extensive twenty-five country sample. German legal origin countries 
persistently have the strongest overall protection of creditor rights, 
closely followed by English legal origin countries; French legal origin 
countries persistently have the weakest. 
Moreover, there is evidence of particular emphases in legal 
protection styles. Thus within creditor rights, English legal origins 
have generally stronger protection of creditor contract rights, and 
generally weaker minimum capital restrictions; German legal origins 
have generally stronger minimum capital requirements and duties on 
directors to file for insolvency when companies are financially 
distressed; and French legal origin countries have generally weaker 
insolvency (or bankruptcy) law protection for creditors.145  
2. State of development 
In both our twenty-five country shareholder and creditor rights 
indices, developing and transition economies have lower average 
scores throughout the study period than do developed countries. 
This is consistent with the claim that greater investor protection is 
 
 144. We observed similar patterns in the evolution of shareholder and creditor protection 
in our five-country, thirty-six-year dataset. See Armour et al., supra note 77, at 609–15. 
 145. See id. at 613–14. 
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associated with greater financial sector development. However, our 
econometric tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no link between 
these variables.146 Moreover, variable-by-variable analyses of creditor 
rights reveal that there is less variance in average scores by variable 
for developing, as opposed to developed countries, than there is 
when the analysis is conducted by reference to the legal origin of 
countries. The fact that differences between the formal structure of 
legal rules is greater by legal origin than by state of development, 
and that we find no statistically significant link between development 
and rule content, is consistent with the ideas that regulatory style  
(a) exhibits path dependencies (the association with legal origin) but 
(b) is largely a formal, rather than a functional, matter. In other 
words, different rule-types (to which we may add, different types of 
private contracts made in the shadow of the legal rules) are capable 
of achieving similar outcomes in the real economy, with no 
corresponding differences in financial development.  
3. Rule types 
A novel finding from our data is the way in which indices for 
different types of rules exhibit different properties both in relation to 
legal origins and to changes over time. For example, in our twenty-
five country datasets, shareholder rights show relatively little variance 
by legal origin, and exhibit a relatively high degree of convergence 
over time. In contrast, creditor rights display a more significant 
degree of variation by legal origin, and do not converge in any 
obvious way—differences by origin remain persistent over time. 
Corresponding differences are also present in our five-country 
dataset: here, shareholder rights again show more convergence than 
do creditor rights.147 No strong relationships with legal origins 
emerge in either of the two five-country datasets, although this may 
well simply be an artifact of the small sample size. 
Why should different rule-types change at different paces? If legal 
origins exert a form of path dependency on the content of legal 
rules, why is this greater in relation to creditor rights than for 
shareholder rights? Three plausible, and complementary, 
explanations present themselves. The first relates to switching costs. 
 
 146. Fagernäs et al., supra note 126; Sarkar, supra note 127; Armour et al., supra note 
83. 
 147. Armour et al., supra note 77, at 620–25. 
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Creditor rights are, in a sense, more fundamental (in the sense of 
being less susceptible to alteration) than shareholder rights.148 The 
latter affect only parties who choose to become shareholders: the 
relation is essentially voluntary. Thus, the role of law in relation to 
shareholder rights is essentially one of providing standard terms that 
reduce parties’ contracting costs. Parties who do not like these terms 
may usually contract around them.149 This means that it is quite 
straightforward to enhance shareholder rights on a prospective basis. 
A new form of business organization, a new stock exchange, or a 
new body of listing rules, may be introduced only for those firms 
that choose to utilize the new framework—for example, the creation 
of the Stock Exchange Board of India (SEBI),150 or the Novo 
Mercado in Brazil.151 This involves far lower switching costs. 
Secondly, and because of this difference, an improvement in 
shareholder rights for publicly-traded companies does not entail 
significant distributional effects for any parties enjoying privileged 
positions under the existing framework.152 In contrast, changes to 
creditor rights affect not only the parties to particular (credit) 
contracts, but also affect all other actual or potential creditors either 
by altering their potential payoffs in insolvency if the debtor defaults, 
or the probability that the debtor will in fact default at all.153 This 
change in creditor rights implies more extensive distributional effects 
and consequently greater resistance.154 For example, foreign banks, 
lacking local knowledge, benefit disproportionately from 
 
 148. See, e.g., John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of 
Corporate Law, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 429 (2007); Kenneth Ayotte & Patrick Bolton, 
Optimal Property Rights in Financial Contracting (American Law and Economics Association, 
Working Paper No. 4, 2007), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/ 
berkeley_law_econ/Spring2007a/4/; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential 
Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000). 
 149. See Armour & Whincop, supra note 148. 
 150. See generally John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of 
India, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 491 (2009); see also Afra Afsharipour, Corporate Governance 
Convergence: Lessons from the Indian Experiment, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 335, 355–56 
(2009). 
 151. Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Dual Capital Markets as 
a Financial Development Strategy: Brazil, the U.S., and the EU (Yale Law School, Working 
Paper, 2009); see also Erica Gorga, Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership from 
Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence from Brazil and Consequences for 
Emerging Countries, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 439 (2009). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See sources cited supra note 148.  
 154. Armour & Lele, supra note 150, at 504, 520. 
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enhancements of creditor rights in transition economies.155 Domestic 
banks may therefore have incentives to oppose improvements in 
creditor rights for competitive reasons. In contrast, improvements to 
the rights of shareholders in public firms affect only those firms that 
choose to go public; in most countries only a minority of large firms 
are publicly-traded.156 Hence, blockholders who wish to avoid losing 
out from the new rules need not oppose the rules; they need only 
avoid an IPO.157 
B. The Mechanisms of Path Dependencies by Legal Origin 
A recurring weakness in the legal origins literature has been the 
limitation of the theoretical mechanisms responsible for the path 
dependencies associated with legal origins. One way forward, we 
suggest, is through a more detailed account of the institutional 
mechanisms by which path dependencies may persist. It may be 
more helpful to proceed by developing categorizations based around 
measurable indicia of the relevant mechanisms, rather than using the 
often problematic “legal families” classification, particularly when the 
latter lacks a firm theoretical base. Here we sketch the contours of 
such an account, based on the quantitative and qualitative evidence 
we have gathered on the processes of legal change. We organize the 
discussion around three key ideas: mode of lawmaking, mechanisms 
of enforcement, and sharing of property rights. 
1. Mode of lawmaking  
A leading early account articulates two channels by which legal 
origin may affect the real economy: the “adaptability” channel, 
whereby common law (judicial) lawmaking is associated with greater 
responsiveness to economic change, and the “political” or “judicial 
independence” channel, whereby common law judges are associated 
with greater freedom from executive influence and consequently 
lower propensity to engage in rent-seeking.158 Both channels focus 
 
 155. Rainer Haselmann, Katharina Pistor & Vikrant Vig, How Law Affects Lending, 25–
26, 35 (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 157, 2006), available at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/157/.  
 156. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1137 (1997). 
 157. Gilson et al., supra note 151. 
 158. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüc-Kunt & Ross Levine, Law and Finance: Why Does 
Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 653 (2003).  
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on the role of judicial, as opposed to statutory, lawmaking. The 
judicial mode of lawmaking is said to be more responsive to 
efficiency-enhancing changes (adaptability channel) and less 
susceptible to capture by interest group politics than statutory law 
making (judicial independence channel). What matters from a 
comparative, systemic perspective, then, is the extent of judicial, 
versus statutory, lawmaking.  
A basic problem with this characterization is that, in relation to 
investor protection law at least, most—if not all—countries have 
codified the relevant rules. In other words, the simple extent of 
judicial, as opposed to statutory, law making varies little across 
systems. This variation reveals itself in the lack of obvious differences 
in the nature of legal change in our study countries. If there were 
important differences in the extent of judicial lawmaking, we would 
expect to see a pattern of change that differed depending on a 
country’s legal origin. Common law countries would be expected to 
have more rapid accretions of changes in response to development, 
whereas civilian countries would be expected to have less frequent 
but more emphatic changes, corresponding to systemic updates of 
their codes. The results from our five-country and twenty-five-
country datasets show, however, no discernible difference in the 
nature of change by legal origin. Shareholder rights have advanced 
across the board, in a manner that looks roughly similar in all our 
studied jurisdictions, and to the extent that there is change in 
creditor rights, its nature and extent does not vary by legal origin.  
Acknowledging the near-universal codification of investor 
protection laws requires a refinement of the function courts perform 
in relation to these channels. A revised version of the “adaptability” 
channel, for example, would view courts not as providing the bulk of 
precedents, but rather as providing interstitial decisions on the 
interpretation or operation of the law.159 On this view, we should not 
expect to see differences in the pattern of law production over time, 
as measured in our indices. This is not, therefore, a mechanism for 
legal path dependence, but rather an alternate channel (other than 
via legal rules) through which the structure of legal institutions may 
affect the real economy. Thus, we might expect differences in the 
functionality of systems of investor protection depending on the 
degree of efficacy of their courts. To some degree, measures of the 
 
 159. See La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2. 
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“formalism” of court procedure may capture these differences.160 
However, it seems plausible that there may be other factors at work, 
which make a difference to the operation of courts.  
In particular, we consider that there may be important functional 
consequences flowing from differences in the structure of the courts 
or tribunals. Variables that may have an impact on court performance 
include (a) judicial human capital (selection, training, and 
professional background),161 which will affect the quality of decisions 
produced; (b) court procedural rules, including standing, costs, 
litigation funding, and the availability of class actions, each of which 
will affect the likelihood that an action will in fact be brought;162 and 
(c) the function performed—whether solely for ex post challenge 
through litigation, or whether the court or tribunal performs an ex 
ante gatekeeper function.163  
It is less than clear that these factors match up with the allocation 
of “legal origin.” In fact, our case studies cast some doubt on the 
idea. For example, India, a common law country, suffers from 
problematic rules of civil procedure that engender delays of ten years 
or more in a typical civil trial.164 Nevertheless, successful 
development of its stock markets may be explicable in part through 
the establishment of a dedicated tribunal (the Securities Appellate 
Tribunal, or SAT, associated with SEBI) with sector-specific 
expertise and streamlined procedural rules.165 There is no reason to 
suppose that such specialist securities tribunals could only be 
established in common law countries; nor should we rely, in relation 
to investor protection, on any measure of the quality of courts that 
does not code specifically for tribunals that make decisions in 
relation to this area of law.166 This may help to explain why, if this is a 
 
 160. See Djankov et al., supra note 24. 
 161. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Levers of Legal Design: Institutional Determinants of the 
Quality of Law, 36 J. COMP. ECON. 43 (2008). 
 162. Id.; see also John Armour, Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Richard Nolan, 
Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the UK and US, 7 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2010). 
 163. John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Makes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and 
Why? The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 
1767–84 (2007). 
 164. Armour & Lele, supra note 150. 
 165. Id. 
 166. For example, in relation to the United Kingdom, failure to take into account the 
Takeover Code, promulgated by the Takeover Panel, which for most of its history has been 
entirely self-regulatory, would result in a wholly misleading picture of takeover regulation. See 
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channel through which legal institutions affect the real economy, we 
find no empirical association between legal origin and stock market 
development.167 A more focused empirical test would code the 
foregoing differences in the structure of courts directly.168  
For a more nuanced version of the “judicial independence” 
channel, an additional set of factors is likely to be significant: namely 
(d) the status of courts in the constitutional hierarchy. That is, courts 
with extensive powers of judicial review of primary legislation are 
able to act as a restraint on the operation of interest group politics, 
even if the formal (observed) extent of judicial law making is quite 
small. This review may have an effect both on the real economy and 
on the formal content of legal rules. Again, however, this pattern 
need not vary along the lines of legal origin. For example, in 
England, despite its status as “mother country” of the common law 
legal origin, courts have no constitutional power to strike down 
primary legislation.169  
2. Enforcement  
Theory suggests that the efficacy of legal rules at imparting 
incentives to actors in the corporate sector will be a function not 
only of their substantive content, but also of their enforcement.170 In 
the literature on legal origins, contributions to date have sought to 
bifurcate enforcement mechanisms into “public” (initiated by state 
agencies) and “private” (initiated by citizens or corporations). Public 
enforcement agencies typically do not keep the rewards of their 
efforts, and so have lower incentives to engage in enforcement—and 
hence a lower deterrent effect—than do private actors.171  
 
Armour & Skeel, supra note 163, at 1735–38, 1782–84.  
 167. See generally Fagernäs et al., supra note 126; Sarkar, supra note 127; Armour et al., 
supra note 75. 
 168. See Mathias M. Siems, Legal Adaptability in Elbonia, 2 INT’L. J.L. CONTEXT 393, 
393–408 (2006). 
 169. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4(6) (U.K.). 
 170. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 
(1910); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169 (1968). 
 171. La Porta et al., 2006, supra note 13; see also Jonathan R. Hay & Andrei Shleifer, 
Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 398 (1998) 
(discussing the emergence of private enforcement to address gaps in the system of public 
enforcement in Russia in the 1990s). 
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The measurement of the efficacy of enforcement mechanisms has 
proved just as difficult as of the quality of law. Early indices based on 
the extent of enforcement powers172 asserted the superiority of 
private enforcement, a preference that also appeared to correlate with 
English legal origin. However, other studies using data based on 
resources directed toward enforcement173 or penalties imposed,174 
assert the importance of public enforcement of securities laws. More 
recent indices distinguish between ex ante and ex post interventions 
by public and private actors.175 
However, the full range of mechanisms employed to secure 
compliance may be larger still.176 On the one hand, “public 
enforcement” may encompass a range of sanctions beyond formal 
penalties, including reputational sanctions imposed through public 
censure.177 On the other hand, “gatekeeper control”178 is also a 
widely used enforcement mechanism, but is not coded in the existing 
law and finance literature. In particular, a specific type of gatekeeper, 
the notary, is widely used in civilian, but not in common law, legal 
systems. The notary charges a fee for verifying the propriety of 
documentation associated with a range of transactions.179 In some 
respects, this function is similar to that which might be performed by 
legal advisers in a common law system. The difference is that referral 
to a notary is mandatory, and the level of service is centrally 
prescribed, whereas consultation with a lawyer is voluntary, and can 
be metered by the client according to the amount at stake. It is 
plausible that reliance on notaries and other gatekeeper mechanisms 
 
 172. La Porta et al., 2006, supra note 13. 
 173. Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities 
Laws: Resource-Based Evidence (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 638, 2008). 
 174. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 229 (2007). 
 175. See generally La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2. 
 176. See John Armour, Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Road Map 
and Empirical Assessment, in RATIONALITY IN COMPANY LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF D.D. 
PRENTICE 71 (John Armour & Jennifer Payne eds., 2009). 
 177. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in 
China’s Securities Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (2008). 
 178. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE 
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006). 
 179. Benito Arruñada, The Economics of Notaries, 3 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 5 (1996).  
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associated with formalities might have a significant impact on the 
efficacy of legal institutions.180  
An additional factor that should be considered when seeking to 
quantify enforcement intensity is that there is probably some 
substitution between aspects of investor protection law and 
enforcement mechanisms. In particular, shareholder governance 
rights—decision-making rights and powers to appoint and remove 
the board—are potentially effective substitutes for enforcement of 
directors’ duties under corporate law, depending on the 
coordination costs experienced by the shareholders.181 Consequently, 
measuring enforcement intensity in isolation from substantive legal 
rules may generate results just as potentially misleading as studies 
based solely on the formal rules.  
Not only do enforcement strategies present an additional channel 
through which legal institutions may affect the real economy, they 
might also be the source of some path dependencies in the content 
of legal rules. Consider first the potential substitutability of certain 
types of substantive rules and enforcement mechanisms. Where such 
substitution is possible, this creates a barrier to change in the formal 
rules. To implement such a change may require not only a change in 
the formal rules, but also the development of an alternative 
enforcement mechanism.  
Secondly, consider the role accorded to gatekeepers such as 
notaries in many legal systems. They constitute an interest group, 
internal to the legal system, which is likely to have a bias against 
change. Changes to the rules devalue the human capital of all 
professionals specific to a particular set of transactional rules and 
require a further investment in rule-specific human capital. For those 
whose services are metered (such as business lawyers), these costs can 
be offset by increased demand for legal services following a change in 
the law, as clients also need to learn what is involved. For those 
whose services are not metered, but who operate based on fixed 
transaction fees (as is the case for notary services in many countries), 
the change is simply uncompensated. This evolution may create an 
additional source of path dependence for legal systems heavily reliant 
on notaries as gatekeepers.  
 
 180. One might also expect the organization and training of these professions to be 
relevant variables. See Hadfield, supra note 161.  
 181. Armour, supra note 176, at 102–09. 
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3. Shared property rights 
All systems of corporate law involve some partitioning of the 
rights of ownership to assets between different classes of investors.182 
The property rights in these assets (be they physical or financial) are 
therefore shared between the participants.183 Such sharing 
presupposes some mechanism for dealing with the problem of 
“ostensible ownership” where one of the shared owners deals with a 
third party on the basis that they are sole owner. In this case, either 
the other shared owners, or the third party, loses out. Legal systems 
have three basic mechanisms for dealing with this problem: (a) the 
numerus clausus principle; (b) selective enforcement or negotiability; 
and (c) registration.  
The numerus clausus approach posits a fixed set of arrangements 
for sharing property rights. By limiting the set, third parties may be 
confident that they can limit their due diligence endeavors to 
inquiries focused on this particular list.184 Alternatively, selective 
enforcement involves ex post adjudication by a court as to which of 
the “passive” owners or the third party could have avoided the 
problem at least cost, e.g., by the passive owners doing more to 
publicize their interest, or the third party making greater inquiries.185 
Lastly, registration mechanisms provide an authoritative repository of 
information about the nature of passive ownership interests.186 
The three mechanisms are functional substitutes in the resolution 
of the problem of ostensible ownership: any one of the three is 
capable of reducing the costs thereby incurred to a manageable level. 
However, they have quite different dynamic properties. The numerus 
clausus approach, in particular, makes it very costly to introduce new 
ways of sharing property rights, other than those on the existing list. 
All transacting parties need to add to their list of potential questions 
if a new entrant is added. In contrast, selective enforcement imposes 
few additional costs for third parties if a new property-sharing 
 
 182. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 148. 
 183. Armour & Whincop, supra note 148. 
 184. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). 
 185. John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, An Economic Analysis of Shared Property in 
Partnership and Close Corporations Law, 26 J. CORP. L. 983 (2001). 
 186. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 393–95 
(2001). 
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arrangement is introduced: the more unusual the arrangement, the 
more effort the passive owners must undertake to bring it to others’ 
attention. Registration lies somewhere between these poles, 
depending on how the mechanism is implemented.187 
Numerus clausus approaches have traditionally been associated 
with civil law systems; selective enforcement mechanisms (through 
the doctrines of “bona fide purchaser” and “constructive notice”) 
have been linked with the equitable jurisdiction present in common 
law systems. This duality, therefore, constitutes a plausible channel 
through which path dependencies in the content of legal rules might 
operate. In particular, this could help to explain the relative lack of 
contractual protections for creditors in French civil law jurisdictions, 
which rely on the numerus clausus approach. 
C. Are Legal Origins “Endogenous”? 
Summing up this part of our discussion, we have seen that a 
focus on “infrastructural” aspects of legal systems can help in 
explaining some of the mechanisms of legal dependency. A first point 
to note is that these mechanisms do not always map very well onto 
the civil law-common law divide. This mode of lawmaking (judicial 
versus statutory), although often referred to in the legal origins 
literature, is not a convincing explanation for divergences in 
corporate law, given the predominant role played by statute, and the 
correspondingly interstitial role of the courts, in all jurisdictions. 
There is more scope for viewing difference in enforcement strategies 
and modes of interpretation along legal origin lines. However, we 
need more information to be sure that the classification of systems by 
reference to legal “families” is the right approach to take. We also 
need to carry out a mapping exercise so we have an objective basis 
for differentiating between the “infrastructural” aspects of different 
systems. Once that is done, we may have a firmer basis for 
determining whether the legal families classification is a useful one. 
Second, a closer identification of the factors that might be 
driving legal path dependencies will assist us in assessing how far 
legal systems can be said to be “exogenous” or “endogenous” with 
regard to economic development. A possible working hypothesis 
would be that differences in enforcement strategies (public versus 
 
 187. See John Armour, The Law and Economics Debate About Secured Lending: Lessons for 
European Lawmaking?, 5 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 3, 25–28 (2008). 
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private) and modes of interpretation (open-ended legal categories 
versus the numerus clausus approach) could have an impact on the 
extent to which the legal system supports transactional flexibility and 
hence financial innovation. Possible tradeoffs between granting 
transactional flexibility and protecting third party interests have also 
been noted. If institutional factors such as these have implications for 
the nature and extent of financial development independent of the 
operation of formal legal rules, we may have part of the explanation 
for the limited impact of formal convergence in shareholder 
protection over the past decade. But if legal infrastructure is linked 
to economic outcomes in this way, it is also likely that there will have 
been some matching of legal institutions to economic and political 
structures over time in the systems concerned. It would, for example, 
be in the interests of particular interest groups to lobby to defend 
certain enforcement strategies against changes that would leave them 
worse off. Causal relations may therefore run in both directions. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
For the past decade or so, legal reforms worldwide have followed 
a consistent pattern. Shareholder rights and corporate governance 
standards have been strengthened in the belief that this would lead 
to more dispersed share ownership and more liquid capital markets, 
and creditor rights have been enhanced with a view to fostering 
flows of private credit. The legal origins hypothesis provided at least 
one theoretical underpinning for these developments by claiming 
that legal systems affect long-run patterns of economic development. 
Systems with a common law origin were thought to favor market-
facilitating laws, whereas those with roots in the French or German 
civil law were seen as tending towards an activist role for the state. 
These underlying differences of regulatory style were, it was argued, 
reflected in the contents of the laws governing the business 
enterprise and in economic outcomes. As applied by the World Bank 
through its Doing Business reports, this approach directly influenced 
policy initiatives in dozens of countries. 
Despite its influence, unanswered questions remain relating to 
the legal origins hypothesis. At a theoretical level, the theory lacks 
clarity concerning the channels through which legal origins might 
impact the substance of legal rules and economic outcomes. From an 
empirical viewpoint, the claim suffers from a serious shortcoming in 
that the evidence for the legal origins effect rests on quantitative 
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indicators that offer a cross-sectional view of the law (mostly of the 
content of laws as they were in the late 1990s). The findings from 
these studies can only be valid if it is assumed that laws change 
relatively little and that the ranking order of countries, in terms of 
the impact of regulation on business, does not change much over 
time. These issues can be tested empirically. We set out to develop 
longitudinal datasets that could be used to throw light on the nature 
and extent of changes to the substantive law and to assess their 
relationship to legal origins, on the one hand, and to financial 
development on the other.  
We have now produced a number of new datasets tracking legal 
change over time in the areas of shareholder protection and creditor 
protection. Our indices include sixty indicators that code for the law 
of five significant countries (France, Germany, India, the UK ,and 
the U.S.) for the thirty-six year period between 1970 and 2005, and 
reduced-form indices of ten indicators, which code for the laws in a 
wider sample, twenty-five countries, for the period between 1995 
and 2005. The coding methods we have used incorporate a wider 
range of legal and regulatory variables than earlier studies and take 
into account the different ways in which regulatory rules can be 
expressed (as mandatory rules or as “defaults” applying in the 
absence of contrary agreement). We have used time-series and panel 
data econometric analysis to test for correlations between the 
changing state of the law over time and economic outcome variables.  
Our datasets provide a different picture of the state of the law 
than that provided by the early legal origins papers. We see 
considerable change in the area of shareholder protection, with civil 
law systems catching up with their common law counterparts, in 
particular over the decade leading up to 2005. This suggests that 
lock-in through legal origin has not been much of an obstacle to the 
formal convergence of systems. In the case of creditor protection, we 
do not see a clear common law-civil law divide, but we do find 
evidence to support a classification of systems by legal “families”; 
German-origin systems have consistently higher scores, with English-
origin ones in the middle and French-origins systems showing 
generally low levels of support for creditor rights. 
What about the impact of legal change? The econometric 
findings we have reviewed here call into question the widespread 
assumption that enhancing shareholders’ rights has positive 
economic effects. We find that increases in shareholder protection 
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have not led to greater stock market development, as might have 
been expected. For some key variables, the relationship between legal 
change and financial development is negative. One possible 
interpretation of our results is that a “one size fits all” approach to 
corporate governance reforms, stressing elements of British and 
American practice—the role of independent boards and the market 
for corporate control—may not be working as intended in civilian 
and developing systems. Another interpretation is that even in the 
common law world, shareholder protection can have 
counterproductive effects, by unnecessarily raising the costs 
associated with a stock exchange listing. 
A theoretical implication of our work is that legal systems are not 
the independent, “exogenous” force that legal origins theory takes 
them to be. Legal systems are, to some degree, “endogenous” in the 
sense of being shaped by their economic and political environment. 
We should expect to see feedback effects not simply between 
economic and political variables and the content of legal rules, but 
also between these contextual factors and the “infrastructural” core 
of legal systems.  
The empirical analysis of legal origins is still, in significant 
respects, a work in progress. The research project initiated just over a 
decade ago by LLSV shows no sign of running out of steam. On the 
contrary, with new techniques being deployed and an active 
theoretical debate going on, it is continuing to progress. Time-series 
evidence has enhanced our understanding of the legal origins 
hypothesis, clarifying some claims with which it is associated while 
undermining others, but we are still some way from fully 
understanding the forces at work in the law-economy relation. 
 
 
